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INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy law has long struggled with specific performance and other 
equitable remedies.1 Confusion in the caselaw abounds.2 Bankruptcy policies 
favoring equality of treatment, maximizing values, and reorganization all 
suggest that, in bankruptcy, the non-debtor party’s right to specific relief, like 
money damage remedies, should be treated as “claims,” monetized, given pro 
rata treatment (unless otherwise entitled to priority) and discharged.3 
Notwithstanding those policies, and the text of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),4 
many courts, particularly Article III appellate courts, have concluded that an 
injunction or other equitable remedy is not a “claim” unless the court’s decree 
can be satisfied by the payment of money under nonbankruptcy law.5 
This Article argues that consistent with the Code’s text and policy, 
injunctions or other forms of equitable relief should be presumptively treated as 
“claims,” even if nonbankruptcy law does not permit the enjoined party to satisfy 
the injunction by the payment of money. This presumption, however, should be 
rebuttable. No categorical rule can determine when equitable remedies should 
be monetized and discharged. Consistent with a chancery tradition of flexibility 
and discretion in the employment of equitable remedies stretching back for 
 
 1 See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 365.10, 365.11, 365.12, 365.15 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017); Timothy B. Matthews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code 
(pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339 (1983); Jay Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 227 (1989). 
 2 See Jonathan H. Moss, Has Bankruptcy Forgotten the Restrictive Covenant? A Disturbing Trend for 
Franchise Systems, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 237, 259 n.140 (1994) (“As Chateaugay unfortunately indicates, the 
confusion over treatment of equitable remedies in bankruptcy is far from over.”); Ashley S. Hohimer, 
Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Is an Equitable Interest in Property More Than Just a “Claim”?, 19 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 499, 500 (2003) (“A constructive trust is perhaps the most visible example of bankruptcy courts’ 
confusion regarding treatment of equitable interests in a bankruptcy proceeding.”); Alec P. Ostrow, The 
Equitable Claim in Bankruptcy, or What’s in a Claim? That Which We Call an Equitable Remedy?, 2008 ANN. 
SURV. OF BANKR. L. 3, 4–5 (2008) (noting confusion in case law over availability of equitable remedies 
establishing an alternative right to damages as claims).  
 3 See infra notes 94–95 & 140–41 and accompanying text.  
 4 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(B), 502(b)–(c) (2012) discussed infra text at notes 100–105. 
 5 See In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1994); Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493, 
497–98 (6th Cir. 2001); infra text at notes 126-43 and cases cited therein. 
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centuries,6 however, a balancing approach can appropriately determine the 
availability of equitable relief.  
The following circumstances all weigh in favor of Code-imposed 
monetization:  
i. promotion of bankruptcy policies favoring collective value 
maximization, equality of treatment among similarly situated 
creditors, and rehabilitation of the debtor; 
ii. the source of the equitable right is contractual;  
iii. Coasean bargaining is otherwise feasible; 
iv. only the private interests of the parties rather than third party or 
public interests support the issuance of injunctive relief; 
v. if the debtor is an individual rather than an entity, a monetary 
claim based on the same breach of performance would be 
dischargeable;  
vi. the availability of injunctive relief is tied to insolvency under 
the otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law; and 
vii. the injunction at issue is not a means for simply preserving from 
an avoidance a conveyance of property that otherwise would be 
a final non-avoidable transfer under bankruptcy law.  
When these factors tilt against equitable relief then monetization and 
discharge is the correct result absent compelling countervailing nonbankruptcy 
policies. 
The argument in support of this balancing approach is developed below. Part 
I discusses the availability of equitable relief under nonbankruptcy law, 
including the tradition of discretion that historically governs the availability of 
such relief. It also notes the increasing availability of such relief under both 
statute and common law in the past 30 years, a trend that only heightens the 
importance of getting the treatment in bankruptcy right. Part II critiques the 
confused state of the authorities regarding treatment of equitable remedies in 
bankruptcy and argues that the existing Code, properly construed, carries 
forward nonbankruptcy tradition by conferring discretion on bankruptcy judges 
to monetize nonbankruptcy entitlements to equitable relief by weighing 
bankruptcy as well as nonbankruptcy equities. Part III lays out special 
insolvency-related factors that should govern that exercise of discretion in 
bankruptcy. A short conclusion follows.  
 
 6 See infra notes 31–51 and accompanying text. But see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. 
Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
203, 210 (2012).  
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I. EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER NONBANKRUPTCY LAW 
Equitable relief may be available to both private and governmental parties 
under contract law and a wide variety of statutes. Even if nonmonetary equitable 
relief is available, typically the injured party may elect monetary relief in lieu 
of, or in addition to, equitable relief. And even if equitable relief is the usual 
remedy for a particular contractual or statutory breach of duty, courts generally 
have discretion to deny equitable relief based on equitable or public policy 
considerations, even when the adequacy of monetary relief is doubtful.7 
Bankruptcy equities or policies, however, are commonly ignored by 
nonbankruptcy courts faced with a question of whether to make equitable relief 
available. Indeed, perversely from the point of view of bankruptcy policy, 
nonbankruptcy courts sometimes view the obligee’s insolvency as a relevant, or 
even sufficient, equitable basis to substitute specific relief for monetary relief 
that would otherwise be afforded.8  
A. Contractual Rights 
Contract law generally seeks to place an injured party in as good a position 
as it would have enjoyed had the breaching counterparty performed: the injured 
party’s “expectancy” interest.9 Both specific and substitutionary “expectancy” 
remedies exist. Substitution will involve some effort to measure what was lost 
in money terms (subject to problems of proof and other limitations on contract 
recovery). Such damages compensate the injured party for the expected gain the 
promised performance would have generated.  
A legal system that has only compensatory, substitutionary remedies does 
not regulate conduct directly.10 If circumstances render monetary relief 
inadequate, a second “expectancy” remedy, a court decree requiring the party in 
breach to perform its original obligations under the contract on pain of contempt, 
 
 7 EMILY SHERWIN & THEODORE EISENBERG, AMES, CHAFEE AND RE ON REMEDIES 410 (2012) 
(“[Courts] weigh the plaintiff’s need for an injunction against the hardship an injunction will impose on the 
defendant; they inquire with particular care into the conduct of both parties leading up to the dispute; they 
consider the burden an injunction will place on the court and the effects it may have on third parties or the public. 
The sum of these considerations, compared to the shortcomings of a damage remedy, is probably the best way 
to understand the modern meaning of the phrases ‘irreparable injury’ or ‘adequacy of legal remedies.’”). 
 8 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 716–17 (1989). 
But see infra notes 91–93, and accompanying text. 
 9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344(a), 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
 10 See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 539 
(2012) (“[N]o society can long tolerate a legal system that lacks the power to grant specific remedies.”). 
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may be available.11 Equitable remedies under nonbankruptcy law that may be 
invoked to remedy a breach of contract include specific performance,12 
injunction,13 accounting for profits,14 constructive trusts,15 equitable liens,16 
subrogation,17 equitable rescission,18 quiet title,19 and reformation.20 
1. Historical Preference for Damages 
Historically, money damages is the preferred mode of legal enforcement at 
common law. Equitable remedies are said to be available only when damages 
are “inadequate,” and, moreover, remain subject to the court’s consideration of 
the equities of the parties, third party interests, administrative burdens in framing 
and overseeing decrees, and public policy. Courts regularly invoke those 
limitations to resist deploying equitable remedies.21 Damages may be deemed 
inadequate if (1) damages are too speculative; (2) the injured party cannot obtain 
a substitute good or benefit; (3) money judgments cannot be collected against 
the breaching party; or (4) third party or public interests are implicated.22 
Specific performance may also be preferred where money damages would fail 
 
 11 For a thorough treatment of traditional equitable remedies, see Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable 
Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 563–72 (2016). Historically, most but not all specific relief was only available 
in chancery court. But the law courts did have power to order specific relief in some instances, for example, by 
issuing writs of replevin and ejectment. See Samuel Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 1091 (2014). In most American jurisdictions, separate courts of equity have been long abolished, or never 
existed, and the surviving courts of general jurisdiction may place little weight on whether an action for specific 
relief is at law or in equity except to the extent that jury trial rights may be at stake. In some situations, declaratory 
judgments can also operate as a kind of specific relief.  
 12 See, e.g., Humble v. Wyant, 843 N.W.2d 334, 340 (S.D. 2014) (specific performance). 
 13 See, e.g., Smith v. Brumfield, 133 So. 3d 70, 80 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (injunction).  
 14 See, e.g., Rye Police Ass’n v. Chittenden, 980 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (accounting).  
 15 See, e.g., Evergreen W. Bus. Ctr., LLC v. Emmert, 323 P.3d 250, 255 (Or. 2014) (constructive trust).  
 16 See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Ark. v. River Crossing Partners, LLC, 385 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Ark. 2011) 
(equitable lien).  
 17 See, e.g., Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc. v. Brown, 343 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) 
(subrogation). 
 18 See, e.g., Moffitt v. Moffitt, 341 P.3d 1102, 1104–05 (Alaska 2014) (equitable rescission or 
reformation). 
 19 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Upland Indus. Dev. Co., 422 S.W.3d 108, 114 (Ark. 2012) (quiet title).  
 20 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Coleman, 768 S.E.2d 604, 611 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (reformation). 
 21 See generally Bray, supra note 11, at 563–72 (Enforcement of equitable decrees may require such 
managerial devices as ex post revision, contempt, equitable helpers, right/remedy relationships, and appointment 
of referees and masters. To limit resort to these devices, courts will typically only order equitable remedies when 
certain criteria are met.). 
 22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1981) (Specific performance or injunctions are 
generally not available if damages are adequate to protect the interests of the injured party.); RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 67:8 (4th ed. 1990) (“The [remedy at law] must be plain and adequate, and as 
certain, prompt, complete and efficient to attain the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy 
in equity.”). 
BUSSEL GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:46 PM 
18 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
to provide the injured party either the means to obtain a substitute performance 
in the market or the expected financial gains from the promised performance.23  
Precluding equitable relief if monetary remedies are adequate preserves the 
hierarchy between legal and equitable remedies. Equitable remedies accordingly 
remain “exceptional” and discretionary. This doctrine has been criticized by 
some scholars,24 but remains standard fare in the courts and has also long been 
codified by many state and federal statutes, including the Judiciary Act of 
1789.25 
Notably, under the Uniform Commercial Code specific relief in connection 
with personalty is “no longer limited to goods which are already . . . ascertained 
at the time of contracting.”26 Most recent cases favor enforcing exclusive dealing 
arrangements, such as contracts to buy and sell all or some specified fraction of 
the output of a manufacturer’s business during a specified period, through 
affirmative specific performance or negative injunction, or both. In these 
situations, the buyer’s business may be peculiarly dependent upon a prompt and 
continuing supply of the promised goods.27  
Other circumstances where injured parties have been commonly afforded 
specific relief include arbitration clauses, environmental clean-up obligations, 
 
 23 See id. (Generally, legal remedies are inadequate and support the grant of specific performance when 
damages would be insufficient or an unjust substitute to the injured party or where calculating a specific damage 
amount would be impracticable or impossible.); 71 AM. JUR. 2D Specific Performance § 12 (database updated 
August 2017) (“Because the remedy at law for breach of a contract is generally compensatory damages, specific 
performance is normally available only when the complaining party cannot be fully compensated through the 
legal remedy of damages or when damages may not be accurately ascertained.”); Stephen L. Ascher & Andrew 
J. Lichtman, Availability of Specific Performance to Jilted M&A Parties, LAW360 (July 22, 2016), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/820267/availability-of-specific-performance-to-jilted-m-a-parties (noting availability and 
necessity of specific relief in the context of a corporate merger or acquisition). 
 24 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(2) cmt. e, Rep.’s Note e 
(2011); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 165-68 (2d ed. 1993); OWEN M. 
FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6, 38–40 (1978); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 36, 427–
34 (1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 306 n.96 (1979); Tracy A. 
Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1073 n.59, 1086 (2003).  
 25 Bray, supra note 11, at 581; see, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73; ALA. CODE § 12-
11-31 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 342 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-5-1 (2007); id. § 23-1-4 (2007 & Supp. 
2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6051 (2003). See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932) 
(discussing Judiciary Act of 1789). 
 26 U.C.C. § 2-716, cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 27 Loy v. Madison & H. Gas Co., 58 N.E. 844, 847 (Ind. 1900) (natural gas for house); Spielman v. Sigrist, 
72 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (cigarettes); Ctr. Chem. Co. v. Avril, Inc., 392 F.2d 289, 290 (5th 
Cir. 1968) (commercial cleaning products); Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320, 323 (N.Y. 
1975) (bread crumbs). 
BUSSEL GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:46 PM 
2017] DOING EQUITY IN BANKRUPTCY 19 
and non-compete covenants in franchise agreements, sales of businesses and (in 
some jurisdictions) employment agreements.28 
Equitable relief has long been typically granted in cases where the subject 
matter of the contract is “unique property,” or involves interests in real property. 
“Unique property” typically encompasses contracts for the sale of paintings, 
antiques, patents, franchises, licenses and equity interests in non-public 
companies. Money damages are hard to assess in these cases because the buyer 
may have subjective preferences not reflected in market values, the specific 
property at issue may only be obtained from the party in breach and only 
imperfect substitutes are available on the market. With respect to real estate, 
whether or not this is factually true in a specific case, it is generally presumed to 
be so because no two parcels have identical location, natural resources, pre-
existing structures and other elements.29  
2. Inherently Discretionary Nature of Specific Relief 
As noted above, equitable remedies are not a matter of right. Accordingly, 
nonbankruptcy courts may withhold or condition equitable relief pursuant to 
balancing the equities of the parties and the possible effects of specific relief on 
the rights and interests of third parties and the public at large.30 In Judge 
Friendly’s words, a trial court has “discretion . . . to withhold a permanent 
injunction as unnecessary even when the plaintiff has made out all the other 
elements of [its] case.”31 A court may use this residual negative discretion to 
resist what would constitute an abusive or costly deployment of its equitable 
 
 28 See Christina L. Fugate, Elizabeth N. Timme & Erin A. Webley, Specific Performance: A Maverick 
Remedy Post-Ebay and Winter, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 199, 204, 211 (2014) (Specific performance is typically 
available in franchise law for enforcing a variety of covenants as well as rights concerning real property); see 
also Matthew J. Burne, The Effect of Franchisor Bankruptcy on Executory Supply Contracts: Does the 
Franchisee Have a Remedy?, 18 BARRY L. REV. 191, 208–09 (2012) (noting that franchisee, as intended third 
party beneficiary of a supply contract may obtain specific performance depending on whether: the goods are 
unique, “cover” is available, money damages are adequate, and the supplier may potentially be harmed).  
 29 The presumption of uniqueness of land, however, is not irrebuttable. See Centex Homes Corp. v. 
Boag, 320 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (finding condominium unit not sufficiently special nor 
unique to justify equitable remedies.). 
 30 See Van Wagner Advert. Corp. v. S&M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 761 (N.Y. 1986); Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873–75 (N.Y. 1970).  
 31 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 778 n.116 (1982); see also 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension of Snyder v. Sahlem, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, 
C.J.); but see Andrew Kull, Ponzi, Property, and Luck, 100 IOWA L. REV. 291, 300 (2014) (“There are equity 
problems that depend on the length of the Chancellor’s foot, but the basic rules validating and invalidating 
ownership of property are not among them.”). 
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powers.32 Moreover even after an injunction issues, enforcement of specific 
relief by contempt is not automatic and subject to further balancing. 
Equitable remedies may be denied to a plaintiff who acts unjustly.33 The 
claimant’s conduct might give the court several grounds for precluding or 
narrowing the requested injunction: the plaintiff has unclean hands, an 
injunction would conflict with the public interest, or supervision of compliance 
would be more difficult. The plaintiff may have unduly delayed its suit to 
aggravate the harm to the defendant resulting from an injunction (e.g., because 
a building has now been constructed, or because investments in a film’s 
distribution have now been made).34 
The court will also consider whether equitable relief would impose costs on 
the defendant that greatly exceed the benefits to the plaintiff and whether the 
defendant has acted equitably.35 After considering the equities of both parties, 
the court must then weigh the detriment that will be suffered by the plaintiff if 
left without an equitable remedy and determine whether this outweighs the 
hardship that may be suffered by the defendant.  
Courts also consider the interests of persons not parties to the contract in 
determining whether to grant specific performance or other equitable relief. For 
example, a court granted specific performance that might not otherwise have 
been available where a seller breached the contract for its sale upon learning that 
the buyer had contracted to sell the equipment to a third party at a substantial 
increase in price.36 On the other hand, courts have on occasion granted specific 
performance of a contract to sell personal property notwithstanding the seller’s 
prior disposition of the property to a third party.37 But the existence of a good 
faith purchaser for value will generally limit an injured buyer’s right to specific 
 
 32 See Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The effect of equitable remedies 
on third parties, not to mention on the courts that must take the time to supervise them, is the practical reason 
why there is no ‘right’ to an equitable remedy, why the plaintiff’s claim to such a remedy may have to yield to 
competing considerations.”); see also John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than “Off Switches”: 
Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1460 (2012) (noting that the district court in 
eBay v. MercExchange declined to give an injunction for fear that it would lead to “‘contempt hearing after 
contempt hearing,’” and also expressing concern that administrative costs inappropriately discourage judges 
from granting injunctions). 
 33 See Bray, supra note 11, at 581. 
 34 Id. at 585. 
 35 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872 (withholding injunctive relief abating a nuisance based on disproportionate 
economic harm to the defendant).  
 36 Ace Equip. Co. v. Aqua Chem., Inc., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 300, 302–03 (Pa. C.P. 1975). 
 37 See Schweber v. Rallye Motors, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 1154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), (granting specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of an automobile under U.C.C § 2-716(1), notwithstanding the fact that it 
had already been sold to a third party). 
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performance. In Joneil Fifth Ave., a collectibles retailer sought a preliminary 
injunction to restrain a wholesale distributor from disposing of promised 
porcelain figures.38 The court held that although the retailer established a prima 
facie right to specific performance, the distributor could not perform without 
violating the rights of its prior good-faith purchasers.39 The court stated the rule 
that specific enforcement will not be decreed if the performance sought is 
impossible or is in violation of the rights of a third person which are superior to 
those of a plaintiff.40 Further, the court held that whatever injuries the retailer 
would suffer were more than counterbalanced by the significant inconvenience 
and disruption of business operations of the defendants and third parties that 
would result if the court granted the injunction.41 
Public policy concerns may also outweigh or reinforce any traditional 
inclination to limit the injured party to damages. For example, courts sometimes 
impose specific performance where noncompliance with environmental policies 
would negatively and imminently effect public health and safety.42 On the other 
hand, courts decline to award affirmative specific relief for personal services 
contracts since compelling parties to continue an employment relationship, 
where one of them is unwilling, is against public policy.43 Likewise, courts will 
deny specific relief where factors analogous to unconscionability exist in the 
contract. Still, nonbankruptcy law routinely enforces many rights by providing 
the injured party specific relief rather than a judgment for money damages. 
Courts can be flexible in how they use equitable remedies to restore the 
injured party to its expected position. For example, a court may decide to delay 
 
 38 Joneil Fifth Ave., Ltd. v Ebeling & Reuss Co., 458 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying 
New York law). 
 39 Id. at 1200–01 (S.D.N.Y 1978).  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42  Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 57 (1993) ("Injunctions 
are routine in all environmental litigation, including litigation over air and water pollution, endangered species 
and destruction of habitat, and environmental impact statements.")  
 43 Although specific performance will be unavailable in these circumstances, court can and do enforce 
personal services contracts through negative injunctions.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366–67 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1981) (a properly limited negative injunction can be obtained under New York law to enforce 
reasonable express covenant not to compete in an employment contract.). 
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the start of an injunction,44 to phase it out after a period of time,45 or broaden or 
narrow injunctions as may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case.46 
Moreover, courts may condition equitable relief upon an action by the claimant. 
For example, when awarding a constructive trust, a court may require the 
plaintiff to reimburse certain costs incurred by the constructive trustee.47 Courts 
can employ these tactics to constrain opportunistic behaviors by the plaintiff or 
defendant,48 or contrive a compromise remedy when transaction costs between 
the parties are high,49 or account for concerns about judicial administrability and 
other public interests.50  
3. Modern Trend of More Liberal Use of Equitable Remedies 
Notwithstanding the historical preference for monetary relief, modern 
nonbankruptcy courts have increasingly provided injured parties greater access 
to equitable relief across a wide variety of claims and circumstances. 
 
 44 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 541–42 (2011) (approving injunction that gave the state two years to 
comply); Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1331–32, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (approving 
injunction against patent infringement that gave infringer an eighteen-month “sunset period” to avoid disruptions 
to customers (citation omitted)); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (issuing injunction that would “not take effect until the start of [the next football and basketball] 
recruiting cycle”); cf. Martian v. Martian, 399 N.W.2d 849, 854 (N.D. 1987) (“[T]here may be circumstances 
which justify imposing an implied trust or lien for amounts to become due in the future.”). Among scholars, 
delayed injunctions have been analyzed especially with respect to intellectual property litigation. See Richard 
A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 489 (2010); John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
2111, 2148–49 n.136 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 2035–39 (2007). 
 45 See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (remanding for the imposition of “a 
reasonable time limit” on a provision of an injunction requiring compliance with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act); APC Filtration, Inc. v. Becker, No. 07-CV-1462, 2010 WL 4930688, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2010) 
(extending injunction so that it expired in nine months because of defendant’s contempt).). See also Georgia v. 
Brailsford, 2 U.S. 415, 419 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (affording plaintiff Georgia temporary limited injunctive 
relief pending adjudication of dispute over ownership of money funds). 
 46 See United States v. Vend Direct, Inc., No. 06-CV-02423-MSK-MEH, 2007 WL 3407357, at *6 (D. 
Colo. Nov. 13, 2007) (noting that an injunction may go “beyond the specific violations . . . in order to ‘fence in’ 
the Defendants”). 
 47 See RESTATEMENT supra note 24, at § 55 illus. 5. 
 48 See Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW 261, 262–71 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
 49 Cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement to Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1030–31 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules 
Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 222 n.5 (1995). 
 50 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n constitutional adjudication 
as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable.”); 
R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941). 
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a. Sale of Goods 
A modern trend towards more liberal availability of equitable remedies can 
be discerned in any number of substantive areas of law. 51 One example of this 
liberalization that comes readily to mind is in the area of sale of goods. 
Generally, before the Uniform Commercial Code, specific performance of 
contracts in relation to goods was rarely available. The buyer’s remedy by way 
of an action at law for damages was usually regarded as fully adequate. 
Consistent with the more modern attitude toward equitable relief, the Uniform 
Commercial Code provides for equitable relief where the contracted 
performance is “unique in character and cannot be duplicated,” or in “other 
proper circumstances a substantial equivalent involves difficulty, delay, and 
inconvenience.”52 “Specific performance is no longer limited to goods that are 
already specific or ascertained at the time of contracting,” since “[t]he test of 
uniqueness . . . must be made in terms of the total situation which characterizes 
the contract.”53 Moreover, the UCC provides that specific performance may be 
 
 51 See e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, at § 359 cmt. a (“There is, however, a tendency to liberalize 
the granting of equitable relief by enlarging the classes of cases in which damages are not regarded as an adequate 
remedy. This tendency has been encouraged by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which ‘seeks to 
further a more liberal attitude than some courts have shown in connection with the specific performance of 
contracts of sale.’ Comment 1 to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-716. In accordance with this tendency, if the 
adequacy of the damage remedy is uncertain, the combined effect of such other factors as uncertainty of terms 
(§ 362), insecurity as to the agreed exchange (§ 363) and difficulty of enforcement (§ 366) should be considered. 
Adequacy is to some extent relative, and the modern approach is to compare remedies to determine which is 
more effective in serving the ends of justice. Such a comparison will often lead to the granting of equitable relief. 
Doubts should be resolved in favor of the granting of specific performance or injunction.”); id. at Ch. 16, Topic 
3, Intro. Note (“Courts have been increasingly willing to order performance in a wide variety of cases involving 
output and requirements contracts, contracts for the sale of a business or of an interest in a business represented 
by shares of stock, and covenants not to compete.”). More generally, following in the footsteps of Professor 
Laycock, Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1989), a broad 
scholarly consensus has developed in favor of relaxing equity’s traditional “inadequacy of remedy at law” 
requirement and adopting a more functionalist approach to making equitable relief available. See Samuel L. 
Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1001–02 (2015) (discussing scholarly 
consensus and its tension with recent Supreme Court caselaw while noting that even the more restrictive 
approach of the Supreme Court appears to make equitable remedies more readily available in certain instances); 
see generally Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The States of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. 
L. J. 1397, 1426–31 (2015) (indicating that equitable remedies have been considered or granted in a variety of 
cases, including injunctions for nuisance, discrimination, patent infringement, and environmental statute 
violations). 
 52 U.C.C. § 2-716 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977); id. at cmt. 2; see also Harold Greenberg, 
Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code: “A More Liberal Attitude” in the 
“Grand Style,” 87 COM. L.J. 583 (1981). 
 53 U.C.C. § 2-716 at cmt. 2.  
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decreed where the goods are unique, or “in other proper circumstances,” and an 
“inability to cover is strong evidence of ‘other proper circumstances.’”54 
b. Caselaw Trend Toward General Balancing 
The modern trend towards greater access to equitable remedies in applicable 
nonbankruptcy law has been supported by a willingness to generally balance the 
pluses and minuses of damages and nonmonetary relief based on the 
circumstances of the particular case.55 A well-known example of this more 
liberal approach to equitable relief is Sara Creek Property Co. v. Walgreen Co.56 
A commercial tenant operating a pharmacy in a shopping center sought an 
injunction to prevent the landlord from letting other premises in the center to a 
competing pharmacy in derogation of the exclusivity provisions in its lease.57 
Judge Posner noted that “injunctions are not granted as a matter of course, but 
only when the plaintiff’s damages remedy is inadequate,” while also recognizing 
that in certain “categories of case[s] . . . injunctive relief is . . . the norm.”58 
While noting that the court should not have a starting presumption against 
specific relief,59 the judge clarified that: 
The choice between remedies requires a balancing of the costs and 
benefits of the alternatives.60 The task of striking the balance is for the 
trial judge, subject to deferential appellate review in recognition of its 
particularistic, judgmental, fact-bound character.61  
 
 54 Id. As to “cover,” see generally U.C.C. § 2-712 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977); William 
A. Logan, A Comparison of the Rights and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers under the Uniform Commercial Code 
and the Uniform Sales Act, 49 KY. L.J. 270, 285–86 (1960). The enforcement of output and requirements 
contracts through equitable remedies is further encouraged by U.C.C. § 2-306 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law 
Comm’n 1977), and the official comments thereon. 
 55 The growth of free form balancing in place of the use of traditional equitable presumptions, counter-
presumptions and safe harbors is sharply critiqued in Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The 
Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 214–
19 (2012). Gergen et al., argue strongly that free-form balancing (which they perceive to be a trend driven by 
the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay), by ignoring traditional presumptions and safe harbors that have 
structured the exercise of discretion by courts of equity, undermines the stability of the law and gives too little 
weight to historical understandings about the appropriate use of equity. Id. at 242–49. Nevertheless, they also 
demonstrate how equity and its presumptions and safe harbors have evolved over time to address varying 
circumstances. Id. at 219–32. 
 56 Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 57 Id. at 274.  
 58 Id. at 274, 278. 
 59 Id. at 275.  
 60 Id. (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 
440 (1944)).  
 61 Id. (citing K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir. 1989)).  
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The court considered the costs of a damages remedy: “Diminished accuracy 
in the determination of value” lost from a breach, increased litigation 
expenditures for the parties in terms of “preparing and presenting evidence of 
damages, and the time of the court in evaluating the evidence.”62  
In contrast, the court considered that a permanent injunction remedy would 
require the continuing supervision by a court or third party, as well as force the 
litigants into a “bilateral monopoly” in which they must negotiate, creating a 
bargaining range between the price demanded by the winner-seller of the 
injunctive right and the price that the loser-buyer is willing to pay for the right.63 
The court held that since it was difficult to determine the monetary damages 
associated with lost profits and good will, and Walgreen rightly objected that its 
sales figures and financial projections for use in calculating damages was 
proprietary and confidential, a permanent injunction was the more efficient and 
cost-effective remedy.64 There were few costs associated with imposing a 
permanent injunction beyond the potential bilateral monopoly problem that the 
court viewed as manageable under the circumstances.65  
B. Statutory Rights 
Modern regulatory regimes affording injured parties nonmonetary remedies 
also prominently provide for judicial flexibility and discretion. When a plaintiff 
sues under a statute that authorizes equitable remedies, courts exercise discretion 
in enforcing the statutory right. The existence of such a discretion is often 
express in the statute itself. One example is the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, which authorizes certain suits for “appropriate equitable relief.”66 
Other typical regulatory areas with statutes providing for discretionary equitable 
remedies alongside money damage alternatives include intellectual property 
law, antitrust law, and environmental law.  
Faced with many state and federal statutes authorizing equitable relief, 
courts have looked to history and tradition to determine what counts as an 
 
 62 Id. at 276.  
 63 Id. at 275–76.  
 64 Id. at 278–79. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). For an 
example of classification under this statute, see Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs. Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363, 368 
(2006) (holding that Mid Atlantic’s action to enforce the “acts of third parties” provision of § 502(a)(3)(B) of 
ERISA qualifies as an equitable remedy); National Foundation of Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition Establishment 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-332, § 6, 124 Stat. 3576, 3580 (2010) (authorizing U.S. Attorney General to sue “for such 
equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate” to ensure foundation acts consistently with its statutory 
purpose). 
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equitable remedy and also to determine the circumstances in which equitable 
relief should be given. The U.S. Supreme Court has underscored the distinction 
between legal and equitable remedies in cases ranging from copyright, employee 
benefits, national security, immigration, patents, and environmental law.67  
The Court’s most important recent decision on the standards for a permanent 
injunction is eBay v. MercExchange.68 The Court admonished the Federal 
Circuit for departing from traditional principles of equity in evaluating the need 
for permanent injunctions and overruled the Federal Circuit’s longstanding 
“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”69 The Court made clear that “a 
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a 
court may grant such relief,” showing:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.70 
The Court has continued and extended its campaign against the use of 
relaxed standards for injunctive relief. In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. and Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, the Supreme Court 
made evident that the issuance of a preliminary injunction, far from being 
automatic or even favored, “is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should 
not be granted as a matter of course” and should issue only if the traditional legal 
standard is strictly satisfied.71 It became absolutely clear in those cases that the 
eBay test should not be limited to patent law.72 Accordingly, the test has been 
widely applied by the lower federal courts to requests for permanent injunctions 
 
 67 E.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014) (copyright); Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010) (environmental law); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (patent); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (employee benefits). 
 68 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. 388. 
 69 Id. at 390. 
 70 Id. at 391. 
 71 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555, U.S. 7, 22 (2008); Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 165–66; 
see also Eric J. Murdock & Andrew J. Turner, How “Extraordinary” is Injunctive Relief in Environmental 
Litigation? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 ENVT’L L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,464 at 10,465 (2012).  
 72 See Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 155–58 (2010) (quoting eBay). 
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in a huge variety of cases,73 though it is not applied in every case.74 
Notwithstanding Winter, some of the lower federal courts continue to apply 
more relaxed or “flexible” standards in considering requests for preliminary 
injunctive relief, while others go through the motions of applying the standards 
under Winter and Monsanto, but without giving genuine effect to the principle 
that injunctive relief should be limited to truly extraordinary circumstances.75 
But no court generally views injunctive relief as a matter of right rather than 
judicial discretion, however liberally that discretion may be exercised.  
1. Discretion in Affording Nonmonetary Relief under Statutes 
The first two parts of the eBay test—the irreparable injury rule and the 
requirement of no adequate remedy at law—traditionally have served to 
maintain the line between legal and equitable remedies. In assessing irreparable 
harm, courts have found certain types of evidence to be compelling, including: 
a showing that the loss cannot be measured or is one that nobody would expect 
to suffer; specific instances of marketplace confusion; harm to a plaintiff’s 
reputation, goodwill or brand; demonstrated inability to reign in the infringing 
acts; in a preliminary injunction case, the loss of a short window to exploit a 
work; or other significant business injury.76 However, unlike previously, a 
plaintiff must be prepared to back these injuries up with proof. Unexplained 
delay can negatively impact the likelihood of injunctive relief, both by 
undercutting the stated need for emergency relief and by increasing the 
hardships to a defendant that may have incurred more expense as the plaintiff 
waited to enforce its rights.  
 
 73 See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 422–23 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying 
test when deciding whether to enjoin a state’s enforcement of a preempted state statute); Curtis v. Alcoa, Inc., 
525 F. App’x 371, 380 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying test to claim for injunction under ERISA and the Labor 
Management Relations Act); Yowell v. Abbey, 532 F. App’x 708, 710 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing district court 
for failure to apply test to claim against the Bureau of Land Management); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New 
Eng., Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (applying test to injunction against interference with sale 
of assets by receiver); United States v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-2067 (NGG)(RLM), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 111064, at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010) (applying test to Title VII claim); see also Salinger v. Colting, 
607 F.3d 68, 78 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough today we are not called upon to extend eBay beyond the context 
of copyright cases, we see no reason that eBay would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of 
case.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
the Ninth Circuit “has not yet determined whether irreparable harm must be shown in order to obtain injunctive 
relief in all types of cases,” and noting division in post-eBay cases in the circuit); O’Sullivan v. City of Chi., 478 
F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to apply eBay to a request for an injunction under Title VII). 
 75 See O’Sullivan, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
 76 See generally Ronald T. Coleman Jr. et al., Applicability of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm After 
eBay, 32 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 5–6 (2012) (in trademark infringement cases injunction may be appropriate remedy). 
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Courts have declined to find irreparable harm if the injury could be remedied 
by money damages (in some cases, even when the defendant cannot in fact pay 
those damages); if the harm is hypothetical, minor or uncertain; or if all that is 
shown is that the defendant intends to continue infringing.77 Courts may prefer 
damages over equitable relief where a self-help remedy such as buying 
replacement goods is available.78  
The second part of the eBay test appears to simply restate the first factor; 
injuries are “irreparable” if money damages are not an adequate remedy under 
the circumstances.79 
The third part of the test, the “balance of hardships,” is also traditional in 
equity. It refers to an inquiry into how the injunction will affect each of the 
parties, including a consideration of each party’s fault.80 This traditional 
equitable inquiry is often called “balancing the equities” and generally has two 
main principles. The first is that a court should not grant an equitable remedy if 
the costs to the defendant greatly exceed the benefits to the plaintiff; the second 
is that a court should show this forbearance only if the defendant acted in good 
faith. Both principles distinguish the inquiry from standard cost-benefit analysis.  
The final part of the eBay test, the public interest, is also a longstanding 
concern of equity. The Court has said that “[t]he history of equity jurisdiction is 
 
 77 Eleanor Lackman, Shifting Injunction Standards in Copyright, Trademark Cases, LAW360: EXPERT 
ANALYSIS (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/602587?nl_pk=e843bcfb-0f4d-43e3-8f0a-37f 
651f42590&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip. 
 78 Laycock supra note 42, at 58–59. 
 79 See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 81–82 (3d ed. 2002) (irreparable 
injury results when there is no adequate remedy at law); Gergen et al., supra note 55, at 207–08 (“the [eBay] test 
redundantly states requirements of irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies”); cf. David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543, 548–49 (1985) (requirement of no adequate remedy at law 
was jurisdictional, whereas existence of irreparable injury was a factor for the court to consider in exercising its 
discretion to award equitable relief). Contra Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 392–93 (1983) (finding that courts frequently collapse irreparable injury and the lack 
of an adequate remedy at law, but suggesting differences in timing and scope: adequacy is a question about the 
fairness of giving an injunction to a plaintiff who could instead have sought “a less onerous remedy,” such as 
damages; irreparable injury is a question about other proceedings, including criminal proceedings, and whether 
they “are likely to repair, in a rough sense, the harm plaintiff seeks to avert by injunction”); see Monsanto, 561 
U.S. at 162–63 (finding no irreparable injury at the permanent injunction stage because in a future suit an 
equitable remedy could protect plaintiffs’ rights—a point that could not be made under the heading of “no 
adequate remedy at law”); California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 258–59 (1938) (“For we are of the opinion that 
there was adequate opportunity to test at law the applicability and constitutionality of the Acts of Congress; and 
that no danger is shown of irreparable injury if that course is pursued.”).  
 80 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1990). Cf. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (holding that 
when a court issues an injunction its “discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, 
in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards”). 
BUSSEL GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 1:46 PM 
2017] DOING EQUITY IN BANKRUPTCY 29 
the history of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary 
remedy of the injunction.”81 Here, too, the Court took a traditional concern of 
equity and presented it as something the plaintiff must demonstrate in order to 
receive an injunction. However, in suggesting that “[a] plaintiff must 
demonstrate . . . that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction,”82 the Court constructs a test that in practice allows the plaintiff to 
generally shift the burden to the defendant, third party intervenors, or the trial 
judge to make out any public interest objection to injunctive relief.  
2. Increasing Scope of Statutory Rights 
Consistent with the diminishing bias against equitable remedies in enforcing 
contracts, statutory rights to specific relief that affect administration of 
bankruptcy estates and insolvent debtors have also proliferated. Moreover, such 
statutes may provide parties broader standing to seek nonmonetary than 
monetary relief.83 While this does not remove the limitation traditionally placed 
on such relief, it does alter judicial attitudes towards the availability of equitable 
relief and make such relief more likely.84 For example, preliminary injunctions 
have been granted without a showing of irreparable injury when the injunction 
is requested pursuant to statutory authorization85 in cases alleging violations of 
 
 81 R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 312 U.S. at 500−01. The Court usually (though certainly not always) points to 
the public interest as a reason for restraint, that is, as a justification for either declining to give an equitable 
remedy or carefully delimiting its scope. For invocations of the public interest, see, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 
134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2014); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010) (plurality opinion); Weinberger, 456 
U.S. at 312–13; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. at 440–41 
(1944); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329–30 (1944); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n, 300 U.S. 515, 552 
(1937). 
 82 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 83 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (superseded by the 
amendments of the Clean Air Act of 1990, however demonstrating statutes can provide for monetary relief); 
Sundance Land Corp. v. Cmty. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 840 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1988); Mid-West 
Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Grp., 596 F.2d 573, 591−92 (3d Cir. 1979).  
 84 See generally MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 7.100 (5th ed. 2015). 
 85 See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 744 F.2d 1107, 1120 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(preliminary injunction was properly granted, even in absence of showing of irreparable harm, because statutory 
conditions are met); see also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Com. Comm’n, 740 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(preliminary injunction was properly granted, even in absence of irreparable injury, when federal statute 
expressly authorizes such relief); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 
1991) (tax preliminarily enjoined under Railroad Revitalization Act and Regulatory Reform Act notwithstanding 
absence of traditional equitable criteria); United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-Op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 
(9th Cir. 1987) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction, and holding that FDA was not required to show 
irreparable injury in enjoining sale and movement of moldy, insect-contaminated wheat under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 332(a)). But see United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 398 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that when 
government had not shown undisputed statutory violation of food and drug laws, but only colorable evidentiary 
showing, no presumption of irreparable injury). 
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environmental and conservation statutes,86 postal regulations,87 wire and mail 
fraud statutes,88 securities laws,89 the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,90 and the 
River and Harbors Appropriation Act.91  
C. Insolvency under Nonbankruptcy Law 
Under nonbankruptcy law, a debtor’s insolvency may sometimes support a 
finding of inadequacy of the remedy at law leading to equitable relief.92 Most 
nonbankruptcy courts, naturally focusing on the equities of the plaintiff and 
defendant before them, view debtor insolvency as a factor (sometimes a 
necessary and sufficient factor) supporting equitable relief.93 After all, how can 
 
 86 See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, Dep’t of Conservation & Cultural Affairs v. Virgin Island Paving, Inc., 
714 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 87 See United States Postal Serv. v. Beamish, 466 F.2d 804, 806 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 88 See United States v. William Savran & Assocs., 755 F. Supp. 1165, 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).  
 89 See SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808–09 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 90 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2012); see United States v. Kasz Enters., 855 F. Supp. 534, 543 (D.R.I. 1994), 
modified on other grounds, 862 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I. 1994) (alleging FDCA violation); United States v. Sene X 
Eleemosynary Corp., 479 F. Supp. 970, 980–81 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (“Where an injunction is authorized by statute, 
it is proper to issue such an order to restrain violations of the law if the statutory conditions are satisfied.”). 
 91 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012); see United States v. Schmitt, 734 F. Supp. 1035, 1048–52 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(government was not required to demonstrate irreparable harm since the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act 
expressly authorized entry of injunction for violation). 
 92 See RESTATEMENT supra note 22, at § 360 (“Even if damages are adequate in other respects, they will 
be inadequate if they cannot be collected by judgment and execution.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 944 (1979) (“To the extent that the damages awarded cannot be realized upon execution, the damage remedy 
is proportionately inadequate.”). See 25 RICHARD A. LORD supra, note 22 at § 67:10 (“[I]nsolvency of the 
defendant affords a sufficient reason of itself or in connection with other facts for the specific enforcement of a 
contract . . . .”); Shockley v. Davis, 17 Ga. 177, 178−79 (1855) (where A agreed with B that B would be C’s 
surety, A would turn over to B choses in action and when A is insolvent, a court of equity could decree specific 
performance of the contract); Glades Cty. v. Detroit Fidelity & Sur. Co., 57 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1932) (a 
preliminary injunction is warranted to enforce a surety’s right if the principal is insolvent); Jamison Coal & Coke 
Co. v. Goltra, 143 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1944) (insolvency is a factor in determining whether to grant specific 
performance); Consolidated Fuel Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex., 250 F. 395, 398−99 (8th Cir. 1918) 
(“There is no allegation in the complaint that the appellant is insolvent, and insolvency is a very material question 
in cases where the damages in money are easily ascertainable.”); Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, 87 F.3d 224, 
230−31 (7th Cir. 1996) (insolvency renders a remedy at law inadequate). 
 93 A much-cited early authority in this line of cases is Clark v. Flint, 39 Mass. [22 Pick.] 231 (1839) which 
in turn relied heavily on 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 31. This position has 
become recognized as the majority position in the modern caselaw and commentary. See Matthew J. Lavisky, 
Behind the Times: Florida’s Failure to Recognize Insolvency as Satisfying the Inadequate Remedy at Law 
Requirement for Injunctive Relief, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 119, 125 (2008) (“the majority of federal courts 
recognize that an injunction can be issues, assuming the other elements are met, upon a showing that the 
defendant is insolvent . . . .”); Laycock, supra note 8, at 716 (“Damages are no remedy at all if they cannot be 
collected, and most courts sensibly conclude that a damage judgment against an insolvent defendant is an 
inadequate remedy” but noting that some courts find an uncollectible judgment to be an adequate remedy based 
on the policy of fairness to other creditors). See also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 
Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We join the majority of circuits in concluding 
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monetary relief calculated so as to compensate the injured party be fully 
adequate to redress the harm when the debtor’s insolvency will preclude or limit 
the collection of a money judgment to a lesser amount or even zero? The aid of 
equity thus becomes “necessary to prevent the vendee from losing both the 
goods and money.”94  
An older line of authority, now a minority position that persists in such states 
as Pennsylvania and Florida, however, eschews reliance on insolvency as a 
justification for, or a factor favoring, specific performance.95 This minority 
position while neither explicitly weighing the bankruptcy equities nor denying 
equitable relief in a situation where it would otherwise be available on grounds 
of debtor insolvency, seems more sensitive to the third party equities implicated 
 
that a district court has authority to issue a preliminary injunction where the plaintiffs can establish that money 
damages will be an inadequate remedy due to impending insolvency of the defendant or that defendant has 
engaged in a pattern of secreting or dissipating assets to avoid judgment.”); Deckert v. Independence Shares 
Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 285 (1940); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 825 F.2d 1220, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987) (“[In 
a civil RICO, fraud, and conversion case] [t]he authority of a trial court to issue a preliminary injunction to 
ensure the preservation of an adequate remedy is well established.” Plaintiff showed that the defendants would 
not fulfill an award of damages and was “entitled to a preliminary injunction to protect its remedy.”); Tri-State 
Generation & Transmission Ass'n, v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986) (a 
preliminary injunction was warranted where the inability to collect a money judgment would lead to irreparable 
harm); Feit & Drexler, Inc.v. Drexler (In re Feit & Drexler, Inc.), 760 F.2d 406, 416 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[E]ven 
where the ultimate relief sought is money damages, federal courts have found preliminary injunctions 
appropriate where it has been shown that the defendant intended to frustrate any judgment on the merits by 
transfer[ring its assets] out of the jurisdiction . . . . [T]his is an appropriate case for the issuance of injunctive 
relief to prevent [the defendant] from making uncollectible any judgment . . . .”) (second alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Rep., 760 F.2d 1300, 1309 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[A]n equitable remedy designed to freeze the status quo . . . would be entirely in keeping with 
the principles that undergird equity jurisprudence.”); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 
386 (7th Cir. 1984) (damages remedies are inadequate where “[d]amages may be unobtainable from the 
defendant because he may become insolvent before a final judgment can be entered and collected.”); Jay Cty. 
Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 692 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that an injunction was proper where plaintiffs were unable to collect a damages judgment and were thus 
irreparably harmed); Van Loan v. Van Loan, 895 P.2d 614, 618 (Mont. 1995) (“If [a defendant] disperses his 
assets, rendering a judgment against him worthless, [the plaintiff] will suffer irreparable injury absent the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction.”); Tanguy v. Laux, 259 S.W.3d 851, 857 n.5 (Tex. App. 2008) (citing Tel. 
Equip. Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd., 80 S.W.3d 601, 611 (Tex. App. 2002)). 
 94 H.C. Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 HARV. L. REV. 702, 714−15 (1918).  
 95 See Heilman v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. 100, 104 (1860) (“The fact, if it be so, that this remedy may 
not be successful in realizing the fruits of a recovery at law, on account of the insolvency of the defendants, is 
not of itself a ground of equitable interference.”); Willing v. Mazzocone, 482 Pa. 377, 383 (1978) (“the 
insolvency of a defendant does not create a situation where there is no adequate remedy at law. In deciding 
whether a remedy is adequate, it is the remedy itself, and not its possible lack of success that is the determining 
factor.”); St. Lawrence Co., N.V. v. Alkow Realty, Inc., 453 So.2d 514, 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“The test of 
the inadequacy of a remedy at law is whether a judgment could be obtained, not whether, once obtained it will 
be collectible.”). Some commentators take the view that the Pennsylvania authorities are properly read to adopt 
an intermediate position making insolvency a relevant factor favoring equitable relief but not a sole basis for 
awarding equitable relief that would not otherwise be available. See Lavisky, supra note 93, at 128. 
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by insolvency.96 In doing so the minority rule is a faint echo from a time before 
there were specialized bankruptcy courts, when courts of equity routinely 
administered insolvency law as a branch of the equitable jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, the dominant position today is that nonbankruptcy courts 
either ignore the adverse effect their decree will have on bankruptcy policies, or, 
even more perversely, view insolvency as a factor, sometimes a decisive factor, 
favoring equitable relief. This only can make sense to courts oblivious to the 
rights of unidentified and absent creditors whose own collection rights will be 
adversely affected by the equitable decrees they render. In our modern debtor-
creditor law, state courts of general jurisdiction wielding equitable jurisdiction 
administer nonbankruptcy individual creditor debt collection procedures while 
specialized federal courts administer insolvent estates under collective 
bankruptcy debt-collection procedures.97 The right hand does not know what the 
left hand is doing, or, even if knows, pursues its own policy without regard to 
that of the competing regime. 
II. BANKRUPTCY COURTS MAY MONETIZE NONBANKRUPTCY ENTITLEMENTS 
TO EQUITABLE RELIEF 
A. Bankruptcy and Nonbankruptcy Equities Must Be Balanced to Determine 
Whether a Nonbankruptcy Right to Specific Relief Is a Claim 
The basic thesis of this Article is that the bankruptcy court must engage in a 
fresh balancing of interests in order to determine whether a nonbankruptcy right 
to equitable relief is to be treated as claim, monetized, fit within the bankruptcy 
distribution scheme, and then discharged. This balance will differ, in a way that 
 
 96 Note, Specific Performance for Insolvency, 18 HARV. L. REV. 454, 454–55 (1905) (“specific 
performance . . . during the defendant’s insolvency is [in] violation of the spirit of our bankruptcy legislation, in 
that it creates a preference.”); cf. Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Fin. Corp., 846 F.3d 1, 617 (2d Cir. 
2017) (debtor insolvency not a basis for injunctive relief under Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in suit to enjoin 
release of parent corporation guarantee). 
 97 See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160–62 (1991) (discussing bankruptcy policy of 
controlling state law race of diligence); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547.01 (16th ed. 2017) (same); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors” 30 (U. Pa. L School, Pub. L. Res., Working Paper No. 17-
7) (2017) (“The traditional explanation for preference law does indeed have a second theme: preserving the value 
of a troubled debtor’s assets by discouraging a race to the courthouse.”); CHARLES J. TABB, LAW OF 
BANKRUPTCY 483 (3d ed. 2013) (“The difficulty, then, that preference law addresses is making the transition 
from the state law regime of ‘grab law’ [, ‘first in time is first in right’] to the bankruptcy norm of equality of 
distribution.”); see also KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN HOLT, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1801–
2014 at 258 & n.1258 (citing cases); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3432 (Deering 2005) (“A debtor may pay one creditor 
in preference to another, or may give to one creditor security for the payment of his demand in preference to 
another.”) (first enacted 1872). 
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systematically disfavors equitable relief, from the balance drawn under 
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law. Bankruptcy policies favoring 
monetization of equitable remedies are typically and understandably ignored by 
most nonbankruptcy courts because those policies are not implicated in the great 
majority of their cases. Moreover, because nonbankruptcy courts have naturally 
focused on the equities of the plaintiff and defendant before them, debtor 
insolvency has been viewed as a factor, sometimes even a necessary or sufficient 
one, supporting equitable relief.  
Bankruptcy courts often come to a different conclusion when bankruptcy 
policies and third-party equities (those of the other creditors of the insolvent 
debtor) are presented squarely before them. The debtor’s insolvency, far from 
being a factor supporting equitable relief, becomes a powerful reason to deny it 
since awarding equitable relief in favor of one injured party against an insolvent 
debtor will obstruct achievement of the goals of aggregate wealth maximization, 
equitable loss-sharing98 and debtor rehabilitation. 
Although the rebalancing in regard to the equities relating to equitable relief 
that is done in bankruptcy will therefore create discontinuities between the non-
debtor’s rights to such relief outside of bankruptcy and those inside bankruptcy, 
that discontinuity is fully justified by the new equities that arise by virtue of the 
bankruptcy itself. Were there a unitary system such that courts customarily 
dispensing equitable relief outside of bankruptcy dealt with debtors whose assets 
were being administered in insolvency proceedings, the law likely would have 
evolved generally in those courts that bankruptcy policies (when implicated by 
debtor insolvency) must be taken into account in the general weighing of equities 
as a matter of course.  
But we have specialized bankruptcy courts, not a unitary system. So a full 
weighing of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy equities in those specialized courts 
appears to create a discontinuity between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy rights. 
A broader view of the matter would see the constricted availability of equitable 
relief in bankruptcy as an application of a more general rule taking all equities 
into account when exercising discretion to afford equitable relief in a particular 
context (e.g., debtor insolvency) that implicated those interests. The observed 
discontinuity disfavoring specific relief in bankruptcy represents only a special 
case of the general principle that all third party and public policy interests must 
 
 98 But see Skeel, supra note 97. 
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be taken into account in exercising the court’s discretion to afford a party 
specific relief. The observed discontinuity is therefore illusory.99 
In any event, as set forth below, whether illusory or real, the discontinuity 
requiring a reweighing of equities to determine discretionary availability of 
specific relief in bankruptcy is required by the plain meaning of the text of the 
Code, is supported by one strand of the caselaw developed under the Code, and 
is necessary to achieve the policy objectives of the Code.100 
1. Statutory Analysis 
The Code’s text suggests that those with access to equitable relief under 
nonbankruptcy law should participate in and be subject to the same collective 
loss-sharing as everyone else.  
The statutory definition of “claim” includes the “right to an equitable remedy 
for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether 
or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured”101 
The Code’s claim allowance procedures then contemplate that to the extent 
that any such claim is contingent, unmatured, or disputed the bankruptcy judge 
“shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United 
States.”102 “Claims” are reduced to a specific money amount through the claims 
allowance or estimation103 processes. They then receive pro rata distributions 
out of the bankruptcy estate in accordance with the statutory priority scheme or 
the terms of a confirmed plan of reorganization, and are (usually) discharged. 
The mandatory nature of the claims allowance and estimation procedures makes 
clear that an amount is to be determined or estimated for all claims, and the 
statute makes express provision for estimation of equitable remedies.104 
 
 99 Indeed, wholly apart from insolvency considerations, in enforcing their own injunctions, 
nonbankruptcy courts themselves will sometimes reweigh equities at the contempt stage and effectively modify, 
release or monetize previously ordered injunctive relief in exercising discretion to grant or withhold contempt 
sanctions. 
 100 Of course, if the non-debtor party has obtained a final court order specifically enforcing its rights prior 
to the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the rebalancing that occurs in bankruptcy may be subject to general 
principles of issue preclusion. But to the extent that the nonbankruptcy court failed to consider the bankruptcy 
equities, the bankruptcy court should not be bound to treat the prior court order of specific performance as 
precluding its independent assessment of whether the non-debtor party’s rights against the debtor fall within the 
statutory definition of “claim” under § 101(5).  
 101 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2012).  
 102 Id. § 502(b). 
 103 Id. § 502(c). 
 104 Id. § 502(c)(2). 
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How can a court determine, in the language of the statute “if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment”?105 In a world where nonmonetary relief is 
inherently discretionary in nature, only by doing what courts of equity have 
always done, that is by weighing all the relevant equities to determine whether 
under the circumstances it is appropriate to substitute monetary relief for an 
equitable remedy that would otherwise be available. And surely since the debtor 
is in bankruptcy and it is a bankruptcy court charged with doing that weighing, 
the relevant equities include the interests of other creditors and public policies 
supporting aggregate wealth maximization, pro rata loss-sharing and debtor 
rehabilitation embodied in the Code. Consistent with the basic approach 
suggested by the history of equitable jurisdiction and the text of the Code itself, 
the legislative history of these sections emphasizes not only the all-
encompassing breadth of the definition of “claim”106 but that the claim 
allowance and estimation process contemplates that “all claims against the 
debtor be converted into dollar amounts.”107  
Thus, whenever it is possible to frame a monetary alternative to remedy a 
breach of a legal right also subject to nonmonetary remedies, bankruptcy law 
limits the non-debtor party to a “claim” denominated in monetary terms as best 
the bankruptcy judge can determine or estimate that claim, at least to the extent 
that bankruptcy policies of aggregate wealth maximization, creditor equality and 
rehabilitation are reasonably implicated.  
2. Policy Basis 
As noted above, bankruptcy is a regime for collectively minimizing and 
distributing losses arising from a common debtor’s insolvency and rehabilitating 
financially distressed debtors. Equitable relief necessarily creates significant 
externalities within such a regime. By awarding specific relief, the court 
removes an asset from the common pool available to satisfy creditor claims and 
awards it to the party entitled to specific relief, thus favoring it over others 
similarly situated. Equitable relief effectively exempts the beneficiary from the 
 
 105 Id. § 101(5)(B). 
 106 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 22 (1978) (“all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter however remote or 
contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case”); see Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. 
Ct. 1407, 1408, 1412 (2017) (Congress intended to adopt the broadest available definition of “claim.”). E.g., Pa. 
Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990) (“to the extent the phrase ‘right to payment’ is 
modified in the statute, the modifying language (‘whether or not such right is . . .’) reflects Congress’s broad 
rather than restrictive view of the class of obligations that qualify as a ‘claim’”). 
 107 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 65 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977). 
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loss-sharing imposed on the rest, further increases the losses those others must 
bear, and hampers rehabilitation efforts.  
Therefore, from the perspective of bankruptcy policy monetization makes 
perfect sense: monetary claims can be easily fitted into the bankruptcy priority 
scheme, paid an appropriate pro rata amount, and then discharged. Bankruptcy’s 
goals of equality of distribution, collective value maximization, rehabilitation 
and fresh start are all advanced by so limiting the rights of the non-debtor party.  
These policies collectively suggest that powerful third party interests (those 
of other creditors in maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate and in 
distributing equitably to all claimants) and the public (in wealth maximization 
and fair loss-sharing rules, but also in debtor rehabilitation and fresh start) are 
present in the bankruptcy context that are absent or invisible when a 
nonbankruptcy court weighs equities to determine whether it should exercise 
discretion to afford an injured party nonmonetary relief under nonbankruptcy 
law. Because the equities are different in bankruptcy, the balance drawn will 
generally and properly differ from the nonbankruptcy balance, systematically 
disfavoring specific relief.108 
3. Supporting Caselaw 
Some courts are already groping toward the balancing of bankruptcy and 
nonbankruptcy equities that I advocate in this Article. Several cases take a free-
form balancing approach in determining the scope of the Code’s definition of 
claim based on the facts and circumstances of the case.  
Thus, in TransAmerican Natural Gas,109 the court balanced bankruptcy and 
nonbankruptcy policies to reason that allowing specific performance to one 
creditor would result in inequity for all other general unsecured creditors, noting 
that this should be the common or usual result in bankruptcy. In another, the 
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that even if the purchasers had a 
 
 108 See XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1452 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The 
equities of bankruptcy are not the equities of the common law. Constructive trusts are anathema to the equities 
of bankruptcy since they take from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors . . . .”). See also 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In [a] . . . non-
bankruptcy case, a constructive trust claim is intended to prevent one who failed to meet an obligation or 
committed fraud or other misconduct from becoming unjustly enriched. [In bankruptcy, it] . . . is fundamentally 
different. The trustee marshals the assets of the estate under judicial supervision, for distribution according to 
federal law, under circumstances in which unsecured creditors receive fair but not full returns.”). 
 109 See In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp., 79 B.R. 663, 667−68 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); see also Bride 
v. Wicklund (In re Wicklund), Nos. WW-07-1209-JuKMo, WW-07-1231-JuKMo, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4744, at 
*6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) (optionee of realty had a prepetition claim subject to discharge). 
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right to specific performance under Washington law, money damages would be 
an alternative right that would adequately satisfy their claim.110  
In Venoco, a recent bankruptcy case involving a local environmental clean-
up order, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court111 ruled that pure economic injury 
compensable in money damages is not irreparable harm supporting specific 
performance in the balancing of the equities. Venoco, the operator of an oil and 
gas-producing well site, had not discharged toxins on the site. Moreover, no 
continuing discharge was occurring.112 Venoco was liquidating and lacked the 
capacity to monitor the site much longer.113 Thus, the court held that plaintiffs’ 
request for specific performance requiring Venoco to remain on the site is not 
feasible.114 The court further held the plaintiffs must hire replacement firm to 
monitor and decommission the site, and the plaintiffs can bring claims against 
the estate for such funds. The court correctly applied a balancing approach in 
holding that monetization is the correct result.115  
In Route 21,116 the court refused to order specific performance compelling 
the debtor to clean up a contaminated site emphasizing that the source of the 
claimant’s equitable right was contractual rather than statutory. Weighing the 
bankruptcy equities, the court said, “the remedy of specific performance is 
typically converted into a damages claim, to be considered alongside the 
monetary claims of other creditors as against the bankruptcy estate.”117  
 
 110 See Bride, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4744, at *14−18 (optionee of realty had a prepetition claim subject to 
discharge).  
 111 City of Beverly Hills v. Veneco, LLC (In re Venoco, LLC), No. 17-10828 (KG), Adv. Pro. No. 17-
50483 (KG), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1457, at *30 (Bankr. D. Del. May 31, 2017). 
 112  Id. at *8–15. 
 113  Id. at *16–17. 
 114  Id. at *30. 
 115 At least one North Carolina bankruptcy court has adopted a balancing approach that considers 
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy equities when considering whether to enforce a specific relief or monetize it into 
a dischargeable claim. Cf. Sound Rivers, Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), No. 15-02730-5-SWH, Adv. Pro. No. 15-
00099-5-SWH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1461, at *17−18 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 31, 2017) (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 
469 U.S. 274 (1985)). Chateaugay I and Chateaugay III also identified three factors relevant to whether an 
environmental injunction was properly deemed a “claim.” See generally In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Chateaugay I”); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1010 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Chateaugay 
III”). These factors are: (1) whether the debtor capable of executing a decree or can he only comply by paying 
money to someone; (2) whether continuing environmental discharge poses an ongoing threat to public safety; 
and (3) whether the relevant regulatory authority may itself remove the hazard and seek reimbursement. See 
generally Mark IV Indus. v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t (In re Mark IV Indus..), 438 B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 116 Route 21 Assoc. of Belleville v. MHC, Inc., 486 B.R. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 117 Id. at 89. 
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In In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.,118 the court dealt with the important and 
vexing issue of the boundary between a long-term commercial services 
agreements and conveyances of interests in real estate in the context of severed 
minerals.119 
Sabine, the owner of natural gas producing lands, and Nordheim Eagle Ford 
Gathering, LLC (“Nordheim”) which operated pipelines and treatment facilities 
for natural gas and liquid hydrocarbons, entered into a long term agreement that 
contemplated that Sabine would convey pipeline and electrical easements to 
Nordheim upon which Nordheim would construct a gas gathering system to treat 
and transport Sabine’s gas for a fixed fee.120 Sabine obligated itself to deliver a 
minimum quantity of gas each year or make a deficiency payment. Texas law 
governed the contract.  
Sabine also entered into a similar gathering agreement with HPIP Gonzalez 
Holdings, LLC (“HPIP”) also governed by Texas law. HPIP was to construct 
gathering facilities for the products Sabine “dedicated” to HPIP that were 
extracted from the land.121  
Both sets of agreements proved burdensome for Sabine as oil and gas prices 
fell.122 It became uneconomic for Sabine to deliver the minimum quantities 
promised to Nordheim and HPIP, and similar gathering and treatment services 
could be negotiated at lower market rates with third parties.123 Accordingly, 
Sabine sought to reject the contracts with Nordheim and HPIP in bankruptcy and 
leave Nordheim and HPIP with an unsecured money damages claim.124 
Nordheim and HPIP claimed that their rights remained specifically 
enforceable in bankruptcy as equitable servitudes or real covenants running with 
the land in accordance with Texas law.125 The bankruptcy court, however, 
disagreed, finding that as a matter of Texas law the covenants relating to the 
transportation and treatment of severed minerals for a fee were not interests in 
real property under Texas law because they did not “touch and concern” 
 
 118 In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Sabine I”) and 550 B.R. 59 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Sabine II”). 
 119 For more detail regarding oil and gas real covenants, see generally Michael P. Pearson, Covenants 
Running with the Land, 34 STATE BAR OF TEX. Oil, GAS & ENERGY RES. L. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.jw. 
com/wp-content/up-loads/2016/03/Pearson_CRWTL-Paper.pdf.  
 120  In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 69 (Sabine I). 
 121  Id. at 70–71. 
 122  Id. at 72. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. 
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Sabine’s real property, and were not related to a conveyance of an interest in real 
property creating “horizontal privity” between Sabine on the one hand, and 
Nordheim and HPIP, on the other.126 
Sabine’s close examination of the history and traditional requirements for 
determining whether a particular contractual obligation constitutes a “real 
covenant” or an “equitable servitude” or is otherwise an “estate in land,” makes 
clear that the question has always been subject to an equitable balancing that ties 
specific enforcement against subsequent owners of the property to a balancing 
test. This test implicitly struggles to classify a particular contractual obligation 
as an integral part of a conveyance of property, that operates as a limitation on 
an estate in land conveyed or retained, or a “mere” personal promise.127 If the 
latter, then only ordinary remedies against the promisor are available. If the 
former, then the burden of the covenant “runs with the land.”128 As a general 
matter, the law has not favored burdens running with the land and affirmative 
obligations are particularly disfavored in the balancing process.129 Perhaps to the 
extent that third party interest of adjoining landowners and other upstream and 
downstream parties are implicated, the balance might come out differently than 
it did in Sabine itself.  
Harmonizing and making sense of the caselaw regarding the bankruptcy 
treatment of the multifarious types of covenants and restrictions that purport to 
benefit or burden land is probably impossible.130 Balancing seems to be the order 
of the day under both state court cases and in bankruptcy courts. But the central 
issue seems to be whether the covenanting party has in some effective sense 
intended to permanently part with a right or interest in specific land by allowing 
its grantor to retain that interest or by conveying the interest itself to a third-party 
grantee. Thus, a developer who records CC&Rs and then conveys lots burdened 
 
 126  Id. at 74–79. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. at 75. 
 129 See In re Midsouth Golf, LLC, 549 B.R. 156, 164–65 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2016) (“[T]he requirements 
for a covenant to run are more strictly applied to affirmative covenants than negative covenants.”) (quoting 
Midsouth Golf, LLC v. Fairfield Harbourside Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 378, 385 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 248 S.E.2d 904, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978))). Cf. Sabine I, 547 B.R. at 75 
(noting that English courts do not allow affirmative covenants to run with the land and that American courts 
apply the requirements more strictly for affirmative than negative covenants).  
 130 See, e.g., Hannaford Bros., Co. v. Ames Dep’t Stores (In re Ames Dep’t Stores), 316 B.R. 772 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y 2004) (use covenant runs with the land); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous. Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 
568, 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Since the Debtor’s legal rights flowing from the ownership of the property 
are substantially curtailed as a result of the covenant, and equitable considerations weigh in favor of the City, 
the covenant touches and concerns the land.”); In re Midsouth Golf, LLC, 549 B.R. 156 (obligation to furnish 
recreational amenities does not run with land). 
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by restrictions to third party purchasers, so long as the value of parcels conveyed 
to different third parties remains interdependent in a practical sense, has 
probably succeeded in creating covenants that run with the land. Homeowner’s 
associations whose restrictions and dues purport to burden individual unit 
owners in condominium buildings or similar developments are probably 
similarly situated. When one buys a condominium unit the ownership interest of 
the unit holder (and that of his successors) is necessarily limited by and burdened 
with the financial and other duties necessary to the maintenance and operation 
of the building by the collective as well as the agreed-upon restrictions of record 
in the use of the tenancy of the unitholder.131 The gathering agreements at issue 
in Sabine lack this tie to the conveyancing of interests in land, making the non-
debtor parties’ rights there seem more like an ordinary commercial contract than 
a final conveyance of an interest in property, and therefore more readily 
susceptible to being monetized.  
B. Role of Debtor Insolvency in Bankruptcy 
Even though a debtor’s insolvency may support a finding of inadequacy of 
the remedy at law leading to equitable relief under nonbankruptcy law,132 in 
bankruptcy the mere fact of insolvency cannot provide a basis for converting a 
money damage remedy into equitable relief. Otherwise, except in the rare 
solvent debtor case, all creditors would be entitled to equitable relief, a race to 
obtain that relief would ensue, and a collective bankruptcy proceeding becomes 
an impossibility. The same bankruptcy policy that voids ipso facto and financial 
condition clauses should prevent substitution of equitable relief for money 
damages solely on the basis of insolvency.133 
 
 131 See e.g., River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1994); 
Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 660−61 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010); In re Montalvo, 
546 B.R. 880, 886 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016) (dues obligation not a claim and nondischargeable); Otter Creek 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Davenport (In re Davenport), 534 B.R. 1, 5−6 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015) (HOA fees 
nondischargeable because covenant ran with the land); Liberty Cmty. Mgmt. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 
241 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (debtor’s postpetition COA fees were not “claims” and so are not dischargeable); 
Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs. (In re Beeter),173 B.R. 108, 114, 123−24 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) 
(condominium declaration not an executory contract that could be rejected but a covenant running with the land 
and so postpetition COA fees were not “claims” that could be discharged); In re Lopez, 512 B.R. 663, 671 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2014) (Covenants do “run with the land.” Debtor’s obligation to pay postpetition fees 
continues.). But see, e.g., In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Wasp, 137 B.R. 71 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1992).  
 132 See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.  
 133 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 541(c)(1)(B), 1124(2)(A) (2012); 3 COLLIER supra note 1, at 
¶ 365.08[1]. 
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Indeed, as indicated above, the Code goes further than this. It provides that 
all equitable relief is a “claim” if it arises out of a breach of performance that 
also gives rise to a right to payment, not just equitable remedies that arise out of 
the debtor’s insolvency.134 
C. Critique of Alternative Approaches 
As noted,135 a handful of case authorities from the bankruptcy courts follow 
something like the approach I advocate here by incorporating bankruptcy policy 
into the general balancing of equities when asked to determine whether a specific 
equitable remedy in a specific case constitutes a “claim.” Most courts, however, 
have sought to impose bright-line tests on the question of the availability of 
equitable relief in bankruptcy. These bright-line tests lead to either too much or 
too little deference to the balance drawn under nonbankruptcy law in exercising 
the court’s equitable discretion to issue equitable relief. These competing bright-
line tests are discussed and critiqued below.  
1. Udell 
Under one current view, a non-debtor party’s right to an equitable remedy 
that is not itself a right to payment cannot be monetized in bankruptcy without 
the non-debtor party’s consent. The leading case associated with this view is the 
Seventh Circuit’s In re Udell.136  
In Udell, the court held that an otherwise enforceable covenant not to 
compete in a rejected franchise agreement effectively precluded the chapter 11 
debtor from continuing its business in derogation of the terms of the non-
compete.137 The franchise agreement contemplated that both monetary and 
equitable remedies would be available to enforce the covenant not to compete 
on a cumulative basis.138 Udell nevertheless found the franchisor’s right to an 
injunction under the agreement and applicable state law was not a “claim,” and 
therefore was not subject to discharge in chapter 11.139 
Under this view, bankruptcy courts do not balance bankruptcy and 
nonbankruptcy policies in determining whether specific relief should be 
monetized based on the circumstances of the particular case. The existence of a 
 
 134 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2012). 
 135 See supra notes 109–117 and accompanying text. 
 136 In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 137 Id. at 408–10. 
 138 Id. at 405. 
 139 Id. at 408–10. 
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nonbankruptcy right to specific relief is dispositive, regardless of bankruptcy 
policy. This lack of discretion sharply contrasts with traditional equitable 
principles pursuant to which courts balance all the equities of the case before 
granting or withholding specific relief. The Udell view assumes that bankruptcy 
courts should defer to the balance drawn by nonbankruptcy law between specific 
relief and substitutionary relief, even though nonbankruptcy law would not 
otherwise consider the policies and equities implicated by the debtor’s 
bankruptcy.  
Theoretical support for this view is grounded on the Butner principle,140 
which holds that in the absence of a specific statutory directive to the contrary, 
bankruptcy generally defers to a baseline of legal entitlements established by 
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law. But Udell goes even further than 
subordinating federal bankruptcy policy to state law remedial choices; it 
implicitly (and counterfactually) assumes that state law rigidly distinguishes 
between rights that are protected by “property” rules and those that are protected 
by “liability” rules, placing them in separate watertight compartments.  
Udell has drawn significant criticism both as a matter of statutory 
construction and as a matter of policy. Udell’s reading of § 101(5)(B) takes a 
clause, “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment,” and reads it as if it were “right to an equitable 
remedy for breach of performance if such equitable remedy gives rise to a right 
to payment.”141 It is highly implausible that the drafters of the statute intended 
the statute to be read this way.142 For one thing that is simply not what 
§ 101(5)(B) says. For another thing, equitable remedies that directly are rights 
to payment are already defined to be “claims” in § 101(5)(A) of the statute.143 
Section 101(5)(B) is entirely superfluous on Udell’s reading. Finally, more 
substantively, equitable remedies are generally non-monetary in nature. 
Constricting the definition of claim to the tiny class of equitable remedies that 
 
 140 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 549 U.S. 443, 444 & 450–51 (2007).  
 141 In re Udell, 18 F.3d, 408. 
 142 Judge Flaum acknowledged the self-evident forced nature of Udell’s construction of 101(5)(B) in 
concurrence. Udell, 18 F.3d at 411 (Flaum, J., concurring) (“Rather than appearing not to do what we must, let 
us grant that this statute needs fixing, and that under some exceedingly limited circumstances, we are actually 
permitted, within the law, to do what is normally the exclusive domain of Congress, that is, mend an otherwise 
implausible statute. Despite the primacy of the plain language canon, there is a legitimate, albeit very narrow, 
exception to our duty to follow the unambiguous text of a statute—where the plain language of the statute would 
lead to ‘patently absurd consequences,’ then we need not so apply the language.”). 
 143 Section 101(5)(A) defines claim to include all rights to payment “whether or not such right to payment 
is . . . legal [or] equitable . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012). If the equitable remedy at issue is an equitable 
right to payment it clearly is a “claim” within the meaning of § 101(5)(A) without regard to § 101(5)(B).  
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are monetary in nature is inconsistent with the basic thrust of § 101(5) which is 
to draw into bankruptcy all manner of obligations owed to non-debtors and deal 
with them in the bankruptcy forum according to bankruptcy law. For the Code 
to achieve this objective it defines “claim” in the broadest possible way. Udell’s 
reading of § 101(5)(B) effectively exempts all obligations that a state chooses to 
enforce through nonmonetary equitable remedies from restructuring or 
discharge in bankruptcy.144  
Notwithstanding these telling criticisms of Udell, the Udell test has been 
adopted and followed by many courts within and outside the Seventh Circuit.145 
The view of these courts generally is that the availability of equitable relief in 
bankruptcy depends on applicable nonbankruptcy law.146 
2. “Always Monetize” 
Udell competes with, and, even within the Seventh Circuit, has not been 
successfully reconciled with, a second view of the proper scope of § 101(5)(B), 
that emphasizes the plain language of the statute. Under this view, the question 
of whether an equitable remedy will be monetized in bankruptcy is also 
answered by a bright-line test, albeit one that gives the casting vote to 
bankruptcy policy. Whenever an alternative right to payment might be available 
under nonbankruptcy law, equitable relief is not available in bankruptcy. Since 
equitable relief is almost always an alternative to money damages, equitable 
relief is almost never available in bankruptcy under this competing view. 
 
 144 In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703, 714 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (“[T]he [Udell] test makes no sense because 
equitable remedies are typically designed to provide nonmonetary relief. Having thus created a virtually 
unpassable test, the court ruled it was flunked by the facts before it because the right to obtain liquidated damages 
arose from the contract, not from an equitable remedy under it.”). 
 145 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Hurvitz, 554 B.R. 
35 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016); In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 1999); In re The 
Ground, Inc., 335 B.R. 253, 263 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005); In re Printronics, Inc., 189 B.R. 995 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 
1995); United States. v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009) Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295 (7th 
Cir. 1994); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. NRG Energy, Inc., 457 F.3d 776 (8th Cir. 2006); In 
re Kmart Corp., 297 B.R. 525 (N.D. Ill. 2003); In re Nyren, 187 B.R. 424 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995); In re Altegrity, 
Inc., 562 BR. 253 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016); In re Gacharna, 480 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012); In re Mark IV 
Indus., Inc., 438 B.R. 460; Crafts v. Pitts, 162 P.3d 382 (Wash. 2007); In re Reppond, 238 B.R. 442, (Bankr. 
E.D. Ark. 1999); In re Overview Equities, Inc., 240 B.R. 683 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Privett 557 B.R. 
580 (2016); In re Hruby, 512 B.R. 262 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014); In re Little, 335 B.R. 376 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2005).  
 146 In re Solokoff, 200 B.R. 300, 301 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that the possibility of specific 
performance from rejection is determined by state law rights); see also In re West Chestnut Realty of Haverford 
Inc., 177 B.R. 501 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that if applicable nonbankruptcy law permits, a non-debtor 
party to a rejected executory contract may be able to obtain specific performance). 
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For example, in Continental Airlines,147 the Third Circuit held that 
employees seniority integration rights laid out in a collective bargaining 
agreement could be satisfied by a monetary award, notwithstanding the fact that 
equitable relief would ordinarily be available (and sufficient) as well.148 In 
another case, Midway Motor Lodge, the Seventh Circuit stated that a debtor’s 
rejection “avoids specific performance but that the debtor assumes a financial 
obligation equivalent of the breach.”149 Similarly, the First Circuit has ruled that 
an employee’s ADA suit against U.S. Airways seeking the equitable relief of 
reinstatement was a dischargeable claim because the employee could have 
chosen an alternative remedy of money damages.150 
Similarly, in a purely contractual setting, in In re Aslan,151 rejection of an 
executory land sale contract did not entitle the non-debtor buyer to specific 
performance in bankruptcy, even though specific performance would be the 
usual remedy outside of bankruptcy because a damages alternative existed. 
Under these cases, in distinction to Udell and its progeny, the existence of 
cumulative monetary and nonmonetary remedies will preclude enforcement of 
equitable remedies in bankruptcy.  
The literal view of § 101(5)(B) leading to liberal monetization is clearly 
closer to the mark than the Udell approach which implicitly consigns the statute 
to irrelevance. Nevertheless, it is apparent that in some circumstances this 
approach gives too little weight to nonbankruptcy policies supporting equitable 
relief that may outweigh competing bankruptcy policies.  
In particular, rigorously following the logic of this literal reading of 
§ 101(5)(B) led to the heavily criticized152 and (largely) legislatively 
 
 147 In re Cont’l Airlines, 125 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 148 Id. at 135–36.  
 149 Midway Motor Lodge of Elk Grove v. Innkeeper’s Telemanagement & Equip. Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 407 
(7th Cir. 1995). 
 150 Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 151 In re Aslan, 65 B.R. 826 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). 
 152 The academic criticism began most forcefully with Jay Westbrook and Michael T. Andrew in a 
wonderful series of law review articles: Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 
Rejection, 59 COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988); Jay Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 
MINN. L. REV. 227 (1989); Michael Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 
62 COLO. L. REV. 1 (1991). Nevertheless, Lubrizol continues to exert an influence on cases outside the scope of 
intellectual property licenses expressly protected by section 365(n). See In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. 
766, 771 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (“Some courts have reasoned by negative inference that the omission of 
trademarks from the definition of intellectual property [pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)] indicates that 
Congress intended for the decision in Lubrizol to control when a debtor-licensor rejects a trademark license.”); 
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1076 (2012) 
(“11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) provides that ‘intellectual property’ includes patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. It 
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overruled153 results in such cases as Lubrizol.154 Even settled and otherwise final 
transfer of possessory property rights in real estate, personalty, and intellectual 
property can be avoided if the transferor’s rejection of the underlying agreement 
pursuant to which the completed transfer occurred can allow the transferor to 
divest the transferee of its property subject only to the creation of a “claim” in 
bankruptcy. Each time courts followed this logic to that place, however, 
Congress has intervened to protect the present possessory right of the good faith 
buyer. The interest of finality in conveyancing, and the equities of a good faith 
purchaser of an interest in property that would not otherwise be avoidable under 
the bankruptcy avoiding powers generally outweigh countervailing policies 
favoring equal treatment, value maximization, and reorganization.155 While it 
would perhaps advance some of these bankruptcy policies to do so in particular 
circumstances, as an overall matter of policy, good faith purchasers’ non-
avoidable interests in their property takes priority.  
Similarly, public health and safety may be threatened in some instances by 
an inability to order specific enforcement of injunctions prohibiting 
environmental discharges or other public hazards.156 Such threats may outweigh 
 
does not mention trademarks. Some bankruptcy judges have inferred from the omission that Congress codified 
Lubrizol with respect to trademarks . . . .”); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2003) (“[S]ince the Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks in its protected class of intellectual property, 
Lubrizol controls and the Franchisees’ right to use the trademarks stops on rejection.”); Raima UK Ltd. v. 
Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that 
because the plain meaning of § 101(35A) does not explicitly reference trade names, trademarks and other 
proprietary marks, these are excluded from the meaning of “intellectual property” and do not get the § 365(n) 
protection). But see In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 966–69 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring) (Reasoning 
by negative inference in the context of trademark licenses and § 365(n) is improper; “Courts may use § 365 to 
free a bankruptcy trademark licensor from burdensome duties that hindered its reorganization. They should not 
. . . use it to let a licensor take back trademark rights it bargained away. This makes bankruptcy more a sword 
than a shield, putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they often do not deserve.”).  
 153 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (2012) (real property leaseholds); id. at § 365(h)(2), (i) (time-share interests 
in real property); id. at § 365(i) (contracts for deed); id. at § 365(n) (intellectual property licenses). 
 154 Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985); See also In re Select-A-
Seat, 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980); see supra note 152 (citing cases). 
 155 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Co., 511 U.S. 531 (1994). 
 156 Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d at 735 (injunction enforceable and not monetized into a dischargeable claim as 
“millions of gallons of oil . . . are contaminating groundwater and emitting fumes that rise to the surface and 
enter houses in Hartford and . . . are creating hazards to health and the environment.”); In re Torwico Elecs., 
Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1993) (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy’s order 
to force debtor cleanup hazardous waste is an enforceable specific remedy because it was “imposed pursuant to 
the police powers of the State of New Jersey, intended to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and 
environment.”); In re Mark IV Indus., Inc., 459 B.R. at 178 (New Mexico’s Water Quality Act authorizes the 
New Mexico Environment Department to obtain injunctive relief against a responsible party to abate and prevent 
future water pollution); Pub. Int. Res. Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317, 329 (D.N.J. 1991) 
(injunctive relief is necessary to prevent defendant from discharging toxic pollutants in an amount exceeding the 
allowed level specified in the permit to protect the public interest of ensuring a cleaner environment); Oregon 
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any bankruptcy policies at stake. Always monetizing such orders whenever 
monetary alternatives exist is not a sensible balancing of the interests implicated. 
On the other hand, monetary relief may be appropriate in bankruptcy even if it 
would not be available absent an assessment of bankruptcy policy.  
For example, in Apex Oil Co.,157 the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA)158 authorized the federal Environmental Protection Agency to 
compel the debtor, Apex Oil, to clean-up environmental hazards on its property. 
RCRA does not provide EPA an alternative right to monetary relief. EPA sought 
to exercise its RCRA authority by obtaining an injunction to compel Apex to 
clean-up the site. Apex argued that in order to comply with the EPA order it 
would have to hire a third-party clean-up firm at a cost of $150 million and EPA 
therefore should be limited to asserting a dischargeable claim in like amount in 
the bankruptcy case. The Seventh Circuit found that since RCRA afforded EPA 
no right to money damages, the equitable remedy could not be monetized and 
treated as a claim in bankruptcy.  
In contrast, in Ohio v. Kovacs,159 an Ohio state agency obtained an injunction 
prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy compelling him to clean up environmental 
pollution on a site for which he was responsible. The debtor failed to comply. 
Ohio sought and obtained a receiver to take possession of the debtor’s assets and 
then sought to have those assets liquidated and applied to the clean-up costs. The 
Supreme Court held that Ohio held a “claim” for bankruptcy purposes.160 
In truth, monetary relief was equally an alternative (or not) in Apex and in 
Kovacs. Had Apex failed to do the clean-up, monetary sanctions for failure to 
comply with the clean-up order could have been levied under the contempt 
power. Apex, no more or less than Kovacs, had no independent ability to clean 
up the mess itself. Both cases were about who was going to pay for the clean-
up, and, if it was going to be the bankruptcy estate, the priority and treatment of 
that monetary obligation under bankruptcy law. The correct resolution in 
 
State Pub. Int. Res. Grp. v. Pac. Coast Seafoods Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d 902 (D. Or. 2005) (injunction granted to 
prevent defendant from further discharging toxic organic and chemical pollutants in violation of the Clean Water 
Act causing harm to aquatic life and humans); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (injunction congruent with environmental policies of state to “preserve and protect natural resources 
and to rectify damage to the environment.”). Note that during the course of the proceeding itself, the bankruptcy 
code provides government agencies explicit public safety and regulatory exceptions to the bankruptcy stay. 11 
U.S.C. § 363(b)(4) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2012).  
 157 Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d at 734. 
 158 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (2012). 
 159 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
 160 See Douglas Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1987) (analyzing 
Kovacs from the perspective of the dischargeability of the monetary claim at issue). 
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environmental clean-up cases requires a balancing of bankruptcy and 
nonbankruptcy policies in light of the specific circumstances of the case, 
understanding that in cases where public health and safety is directly threatened 
by continuing noncompliance, nonbankruptcy environmental policy may have 
the casting vote.161 
On the other hand, to achieve bankruptcy policy goals, it may be proper to 
afford monetary relief in the form of a claim even if no monetary alternative is 
available under nonbankruptcy law. TOUSA162 is a case in point. The debtor, 
TOUSA, was a home builder. It entered into a contract with Superior, to 
construct and sell homes to Superior. Both TOUSA and Superior filed petitions 
in bankruptcy. In its contract with TOUSA, Superior as buyer expressly waived 
buyer’s right to monetary remedies, and only retained any right it might have to 
specific performance. TOUSA resold the properties to a third-party in a 
bankruptcy sale. Superior received notice of the sale but did not object.163 The 
court found that Superior was not entitled to a claim in TOUSA’s bankruptcy 
based on its failure to deliver the homes promised to Superior because of its 
waiver of monetary relief in the underlying contract. One is left to wonder what 
would have happened had Superior tried to block the sale by claiming an interest 
in the property on account of its nonbankruptcy equitable remedy of specific 
performance164 or demanded adequate protection of that interest.165 From a 
bankruptcy perspective, it makes little sense to give these rights to a buyer under 
an executory land-sale contract.166 The proper response is to treat the equitable 
remedy as a claim regardless of the waiver, and allow Superior to share pro rata 
in the estate to the extent of its damages, but not to block the sale or to promote 
Superior to the rank of a secured creditor.  
 
 161 Karen Gross & Matthew S. Barr, Bankruptcy Solutions in the United States: An Overview, 17 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 215 (1997) (recognizing that conflicts between environmental policy and bankruptcy 
policy must be resolved by balancing interests); see also RONALD MANN, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 125–45 (2017) (discussing the Court’s decision in Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. 
Protection which balanced the interests implicated by the trustee’s abandonment power and the public interest 
in health and safety implicated by environmental hazards). 
 162 In re TOUSA, Inc., 503 B.R. 499 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2014).  
 163 See Precision Indus., LLC v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Spanish 
Peaks Holdings II LLC, No. 15-35572, 2017 WL 2979660 (9th Cir. Jul. 13, 2017). 
 164 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
 165 Id. §§ 361, 363(e); In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2017 WL 2979660. 
 166 See supra text accompanying note 151 (discussing In re Aslan, 65 B.R. 826); In re Wicklund, 2008 
WL 8462959, at *6 (land purchasers who were given option to purchase Lot A could not enforce that option 
because they merely had a prepetition claim that was discharged). 
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III. FACTORS INFORMING BANKRUPTCY COURT DISCRETION 
Since a debtor in bankruptcy may treat specific performance rights as 
bankruptcy “claims” when the facts and circumstances of the case make it 
appropriate to substitute a monetary right to payment for specific relief, it is 
important to identify the considerations factoring into that exercise of discretion 
likely to arise in the bankruptcy context. One side of the balance clearly must 
take into account the nonbankruptcy policies supporting specific over 
substitutionary relief. The bankruptcy court must take into account the strength 
of those policies and the extent to which monetization undercuts them in the 
particular circumstances of the case. At the extreme, if dishonoring an 
entitlement to equitable, as opposed to monetary, relief poses an imminent risk 
to life, limb, or public safety, rather than merely economic harm, the balance is 
likely to tilt decisively against monetization.  
But most equitable relief is directed in large measure, or wholly, at 
protecting economic interests and expectancies rather than public safety. In 
those cases, the bankruptcy court may give decisive weight to other factors 
favoring monetization. No list of factors can anticipate all possibly relevant 
factors in all types of future cases. So the following considerations are 
illustrative and non-exclusive. Nevertheless, it is helpful at this point to identify 
factors likely to support a determination that a particular nonbankruptcy 
entitlement to equitable relief is nevertheless properly treated as a claim in 
bankruptcy. 
A. The Bankruptcy Policies 
I noted at the outset of this Article that at least in the abstract, equitable relief 
may impair the bankruptcy policies that seek to preserve and maximize the value 
of the bankruptcy estate for the collective good (value-maximizing), treat 
similarly situated parties similarly (pro rata loss-sharing), and rehabilitate 
debtors (fresh start). Equitable relief has the effect of removing assets from the 
bankruptcy estate to honor in full the nonbankruptcy entitlement of a particular 
creditor. In doing so, the value of the estate is diminished not only by the value 
of the specific asset removed from the common pool, but also, to the extent 
successful reorganization or rehabilitation is impaired, by the amount of going 
concern surplus that is tied to the debtor’s access to that asset.  
At the simplest level, if an insolvent wage-earner needs his car to get to work, 
a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to repossess that car not only removes the value 
of the car itself from debtor’s estate, but also impairs the debtor’s future earning 
power. Upon repossession, the repossessor obtains its full nonbankruptcy 
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entitlement, other creditors’ losses are increased, and the debtor’s prospects of 
successful rehabilitation and fresh start are diminished.  
In a commercial context, injunctions and other equitable relief may similarly 
impair the debtor firm’s ability to operate and therefore the going concern value 
of the firm while preferring the holder of the specific performance right to other 
creditors, running up those others’ losses, and diminishing the likelihood of 
successful reorganization. 
But these bankruptcy policies are not equally implicated in all cases. In some 
cases, no successful reorganization is in prospect no matter what happens to 
parties holding rights to equitable relief. Other creditors may be in a position in 
which they will be paid in full, or receive no distribution at all, regardless, or 
there may be no other creditors of otherwise similar rank who will be adversely 
affected by the specific enforcement sought. Perhaps the debtor is solvent and 
in a position to honor in full all nonbankruptcy rights to all constituents. 
A bankruptcy court may permissibly evaluate and weigh the extent to which 
specific enforcement implicates these bankruptcy policies of value-
maximization, loss-sharing, and fresh start on the facts of the specific case it is 
administering. If viewed pragmatically, those policies are not materially 
advanced by monetization, then perhaps equitable relief remains appropriate. 
B. Contractual Rights  
Claims typically arise out of a debtor’s failure to perform duties imposed by 
tort law, contracts, or statutes.167 As a general proposition, duties imposed by 
tort law and statutory law are more likely than contract claims to implicate broad 
public interests or involve personal injuries. Contract law is mostly about 
protecting the parties’ economic expectancies in most cases. Consistent with the 
general preference in American contract law for substitutionary over specific 
relief in the protection of such interests, bankruptcy courts should be especially 
inclined to monetize equitable remedies arising out of contract breach.168  
 
 167 Less commonly, criminal law may also give rise to bankruptcy claims. Fines, penalties, and restitution 
orders are all examples. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly 
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986). 
 168 Route 21 Assoc. of Belleville, Inc., 486 B.R. 75 (distinguishing contractual and statutory environmental 
clean-up obligations); In re Spoverlook, LLC, 560 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016) (HOA could be forced to 
accept money damages claim when Debtor rejected settlement agreement); In re Young, 214 B.R. 905, 912 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1997) (executory land sale contract); In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 115 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1990) (denying specific relief requiring bankruptcy debtor to execute documents supporting draw upon 
letter of credit because creditor had an alternative right to payment); In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, 341 B.R. 
486 (D.N.J. 2006) (oral sale contract); In re Aslan, 65 B.R. 826 (executory land sale contract); In re Cont’l 
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C. Coasean Bargaining 
In some situations, nonbankruptcy courts and scholars rely on the “Coase 
Theorem” to justify the availability of specific relief.169 These authorities 
suggest that the risk of economic waste or inefficient allocation of resources 
implicit in specific relief is less of a concern if the parties are positioned to easily 
monetize the specific performance right themselves by “bargaining around the 
decree.” If specific performance is more costly to the defendant than it is of value 
to the plaintiff, the parties have a strong economic incentive to agree on a price 
at which the resource is reallocated to the higher-value party regardless of what 
the decree provides.170 But a right to equitable relief supported by confidence 
that the right, if it leads to inefficiency, will be easily reallocated by the parties 
and should be monetized in the insolvency context, because the debtor’s 
insolvency will preclude voluntary monetization by the parties notwithstanding 
resulting inefficiency. While the non-debtor plaintiff can bargain with a solvent 
debtor to release a specific performance right worth more to the debtor than to 
 
Airlines, 125 F.3d 120 (contractual seniority rights constitute a claim in bankruptcy); In re Worldcom Inc., No. 
02-13533 (AJG), 2006 WL 898027, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2006) (“[T]he Brunsons have an available 
alternative payment right, and thus, the claim for injunctive relief is a ‘claim’ under the Bankruptcy Code.”).  
 169 See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992); John D. Saba, Jr., 
Internet Property Rights: E-Trespass, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 367, 396–97 (2002) (“After the court granted eBay 
an injunction against Bidder’s Edge . . . the two disputing parties actually entered into an agreement for Bidder’s 
Edge to continue to list eBay’s auction products on its site, subject to eBay’s terms . . . . The Coase Theorem 
predicts that even though the court gave eBay a property right, the companies still bargained to arrive at the most 
efficient solution.”). See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000)); Ward 
Famsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 373, 377 (1999) (“Writers subsequent to Coase have followed suit in using nuisance cases as 
paradigmatic examples of the role that bargaining after judgment might play in the law.”); United States v. One 
Rural Lot Identified as FINCA No. 5991 Located in Barrio Pueblo, Puerto Rico, 726 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74–76 (D. 
P.R. 2010) (Weighing the benefits and costs of ordering damages against those of imposing injunction by citing 
to Walgreen, which cited to the Coase Theorem: “[M]andating the United States’ adoption and registration of 
Petitioner’s lease is preferable to ordering restitution, which would require, at this late stage, recalculation of the 
amounts payable to the claimants in the civil case and the claimants’ consent to a new settlement agreement.”). 
See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d 870; with Michael Faure & Andri Wibisana, Liability for Damage Caused by GMOS: 
An Economic Perspective, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L L. REV. 1, 57 (2010) (“If the value of GM crops exceeds the 
harms suffered by non-GM farmers, then permanent damages are a preferable remedy . . . . [E]fficiency means 
that the winner still gains after compensating the loser, and because GM crops, which are highly beneficial to 
society, are too important to be permanently stopped. An injunction to stop the use of GM crops may in that case 
be inefficient.”).  
 170 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2–6, 15–19 (1960); GEORGE STIGLER, THE 
THEORY OF PRICE (1966); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 
87–91, 97–101 (1989). The Coase Theorem suggests that legal entitlements are irrelevant to efficient allocation 
of resources in a world of perfect information, zero transaction costs and perfectly competitive markets. If the 
entitlement is given to a lower valuing user theory predicts the parties will transact to reallocate this right to the 
higher valued user. Of course, all recognize that the assumptions stated rarely, if ever, hold outside the arcane 
world of economists’ models. Nevertheless, Coasean bargaining can occur even if the assumptions do not hold 
if the gains from trade can overcome the transactions costs present in the particular circumstances. 
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itself in exchange for a payment from the debtor equal to the value of the right, 
it cannot be expected to transact in this way with a bankruptcy estate which can 
only offer cents on the dollar claim payable in accordance with bankruptcy 
distribution rules rather than present payment in full. Efficient Coasean 
bargaining that might otherwise occur in a nonbankruptcy context will not occur 
in bankruptcy, suggesting that involuntary substitution of a money claim is the 
proper treatment for a nonbankruptcy specific performance right that might 
otherwise have been monetized privately through Coasean bargaining.171  
D. Private Interests Only 
For centuries, chancellors have considered the extent to which third party 
and public interests may be positively, or adversely, affected by injunctive relief 
in determining whether to make such relief available. Typically, in an insolvency 
context, third parties are adversely affected by equitable relief. Removing value 
from the common pool impairs the pro rata recoveries of other creditors left 
behind, and the debtor’s fresh start as well. If only the private economic interest 
of the non-debtor party is furthered by the grant of equitable relief, then these 
adverse third-party and public interest effects of specific enforcement suggest 
that monetization is the correct response. On the other hand, to the extent that a 
public or third-party interest is advanced by equitable relief, that fact too must 
be weighed in determining whether the non-debtor party should be required to 
accept an alternative right to payment. 
E. Dischargeability 
Although monetization of equitable relief generally advances the bankruptcy 
policy of fresh start, certain kinds of money claims172 and certain kinds of 
debtors173 do not benefit from the bankruptcy discharge. In general, in cases 
concerning individual debtors (i.e., natural persons), the question of discharge 
involves a moral and policy driven balancing of the bankruptcy fresh start 
against the nonbankruptcy equities of the non-debtor party holding the claim. 
When the Code draws that balance against discharge, there is less reason from a 
 
 171 Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517 
(1996).  
 172 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1141(d)(5)–(6), 1328 (2012). 
 173 Section 727 provides that debtors engaged in certain kinds of abuse of the bankruptcy process, 11 
U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)–(12), and all debtors that are not natural persons in liquidation proceedings, id. at 
§§ 727(a)(1) & 1141(d)(3), may be denied access to the bankruptcy discharge. Note in contrast that in chapter 
11 a reorganizing corporate debtor is entitled to an all-encompassing discharge without reference to the 
exceptions to discharge laid out in section 523. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), (d)(2–3) (2012).  
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bankruptcy perspective to force monetization of rights to equitable relief. 
Substituting a nondischargeable money claim, rather than an ordinary 
dischargeable one, for a specific performance right is not as meaningful from a 
bankruptcy perspective, and, moreover, with respect to claims (or debtors) of 
that kind, the Code itself, by limiting the scope of the discharge, implicitly gives 
primacy to competing nonbankruptcy policies. 
F. Equitable Relief Linked to Insolvency 
Finally, to the extent that nonbankruptcy law grounds an entitlement to 
equitable relief on the debtor’s financial inability to satisfy a money judgment, 
equitable relief is inappropriate in bankruptcy. Longstanding bankruptcy policy 
refuses to honor provisions in otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law (or in 
contracts) that diminish or adversely modify the debtor’s rights on account of its 
bankruptcy filing or financial condition.174 Such provisions are direct attempts 
to alter or escape from the bankruptcy distribution scheme, directly undermine 
bankruptcy policy as well as access to bankruptcy relief, and are preempted by 
the Code. A nonbankruptcy court’s decision to award equitable relief because of 
the debtor’s insolvency and resulting inability to fully collect a money judgment 
runs afoul of this same policy. If the debtor’s insolvency or bankruptcy filing is 
the reason that a right to a money judgment becomes a right to specific 
performance under non-bankruptcy law, then the non-debtor holds a “claim” that 
should be allowed or estimated in money terms under the Code. 
G. Conveyancing 
One persistent source of controversy, confusion, academic criticism, and 
legislative correction regarding specific performance in bankruptcy has been the 
use of equitable relief as a means of protecting a property owner’s title to 
property.175 Short of cases where non-bankruptcy law or the bankruptcy statute 
itself provides for avoidable title (such as unperfected transfers, preferences, and 
fraudulent transfers), a non-debtor should not be divested of title to property 
acquired from the debtor pre-bankruptcy as a means of mitigating the losses of 
creditors or promoting rehabilitation. Good faith purchasers who have taken 
possession of the property in question pursuant to a properly consummated and 
final transaction should be able to rely upon non-avoidable title to property so 
 
 174 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 541(c)(1), 1124(2)(A) (2012). See also Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. 
Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 663, 702–05 (2009) (discussing judicial 
enforcement of policy against waiver of bankruptcy rights). But see 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, 560, 561, 362(o) 
(2012). 
 175 See supra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.  
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acquired from a debtor, notwithstanding their transferor’s subsequent 
bankruptcy.176 With respect to outright transfers of full ownership of property, 
this principle has never seriously been in question. The problem arises, however, 
when the conveyance is of an interest in property less than full ownership, for 
example a tenancy for years under a real property lease, or a transfer of 
ownership subject to a disguised security interest in favor of the seller (as in a 
contract for deed transaction), or property interests in intellectual or real property 
typically conveyed by means of license rather than deed. Equitable remedies in 
this context are simply a means of quieting the title previously acquired by the 
non-debtor party pursuant to a non-avoidable transfer. Monetizing these 
equitable remedies makes no more sense in bankruptcy than out.  
CONCLUSION 
The central problem with equitable relief in bankruptcy has been the fruitless 
quest for a bright-line analytic test that resolves all cases (i.e., distinguishing 
“property” rights from “contract” rights), or in the absence of such a test 
deferring to state law that fails to take into account the bankruptcy equities. Even 
when state law does consider the effect of insolvency it manages somehow to 
conclude that insolvency is actually a factor favoring equitable relief rather than 
the other way around. The view taken here is that no bright-line test exists, that 
determining the treatment of non-bankruptcy rights to specific relief requires a 
consideration of all the equities, that all the equities includes the bankruptcy 
equities, and finally that experience has shown us that certain factors that I have 
identified (non-exclusive to be sure) are often particularly salient. I have been 
particularly hard on Udell and its progeny which mangle the applicable statutes 
to achieve a result that ignores all the bankruptcy equities.177 The result in Udell 
is wrong and the sharp criticism from Ward and other bankruptcy courts and 
commentators fully justified.178 Failing to monetize the covenant not to compete 
in that case led to an inequitable result and dishonored both the language of the 
statute and the equities of the debtor and the other creditors by precluding a 
value-maximizing reorganization to enforce an onerous covenant hindering an 
individual’s freedom to make his living by continuing to ply his trade in his 
community.  
 
 176 See BFP, 511 U.S. at 544 (“It is beyond question that an essential state interest is at issue here: We 
have said that ‘the general welfare of society is involved in the security of titles to real estate’ and the power to 
ensure that security ‘inheres in the very nature of [state] government.’”). 
 177 See supra text accompanying notes 143–144.  
 178 See supra text accompanying notes 141–142. 
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But it underscores the larger point of this Article to note that specific 
enforcement of all covenants not to compete is not wrong, even in bankruptcy. 
For many years Bill Warren, David Skeel, and I have asked our students to 
consider a different kind of covenant not to compete case, one that arises in the 
context of a sale of the goodwill of a business:179 
Likeable Phil, who had built his pricey fish market, “Phil’s Phish,” on 
his sparkling personality over the years, sold to Dull Don who was 
willing to pay three times the value of the tangible assets for the 
business if Phil would sign an ironclad ten-year, 25-mile non-compete 
covenant and go away. Phil took the money and ran. Within a year he 
had lost everything investing in subprime mortgage loans, filed in 
chapter 7, scheduled the non-compete covenant obligation as a debt 
owing to Don, received a discharge, obtained new financing and 
opened a fish store down the street from Don which he named “Phresh 
Phish.” Assume that any claim for damages against Phil is valueless 
and that Don’s business was sinking fast. Should Don be able to enjoin 
Phil from operating his new store?  
Here the equities are quite different than in Udell. Phil has sold the goodwill 
associated with his fish market to Dull Don for a price, and the covenant not to 
compete in this context is simply the legal mechanism that makes the transfer of 
that goodwill final and complete, and indeed real. Even California law, 
notoriously averse to covenants not to compete,180 would honor such a sale of 
goodwill by specifically enforcing the covenant.181 Phil has disposed of an asset 
through an otherwise non-avoidable prepetition transfer to a good faith 
purchaser for value. Bankruptcy equities do not support upsetting that non-
avoidable transfer. So a bankruptcy court should be able, like the California 
legislature has, to distinguish Udell-type covenants from Dull Don-type 
covenants so as to reach a just and socially desirable result—by appropriately 
balancing bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy equities bared on the facts of the case 
before it.  
Balancing tests do confer discretion on judges, and judges will make 
mistakes in exercising that discretion. But bright-line rules that fail to capture all 
the relevant considerations also misclassify, operate arbitrarily, and work 
injustice in specific cases. Nevertheless, if we knew how to frame a reasonably 
sound bright-line rule, the values of simplicity, certainty, and ease of 
 
 179 DANIEL J. BUSSEL & DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., BANKRUPTCY 89 (10th ed. 2015). 
 180 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600; Edwards v. Arthur Anderson LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). 
 181 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601; Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
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administration would push us towards such a solution. But hundreds of years of 
experience in the exercise of equitable remedies shows us that we do not know 
how to craft such a rule even while it points us in the direction of how to exercise 
discretion in individual cases soundly. 
* * * 
 
